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ABSTRACT
 
The rising costs of health care and burgeoning
 
government deficits have prompted new ways to control costs,
 
while continuing to provide necessary health care. One
 
method increasingly chosen by states to achieve these
 
objectives is managed health care. There are many forms of
 
managed care organizations today. There are HMOs that
 
provide the financing and delivery systems under the control
 
of a single for-profit or non-profit organization; preferred
 
provider organizations consisting of providers that have a
 
pre-negotiated and usually discounted rate for services;
 
administrative service organizations that provide claims
 
adjudication; and managed indemnity services organizations
 
use case management to control costs, while providing
 
beneficiary freedom of choice. The common element among the
 
varying forms and subsets of managed care organization is
 
cost containment. Each form aspires to control the rate in
 
which health care costs are rising.
 
The increased enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries into
 
managed health care plans, specifically HMOs, has raised
 
concerns about the quality of care those beneficiaries may
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 receive is methods for monitoring the
 
quality of care those beneficiaries can expect. There can be
 
a balance between the costs of care and risk of the care.
 
with positive benefits realized from the care delivered.
 
^ 169,397 hospital cases from the 1991
 
California Office of Statewide Health and Planning and
 
Development Discharge Data Set were randomly sampled. This
 
sample represented 50% of all 1991 hospitalization cases
 
from hospitals in the state of California.
 
The sampled cases were analyzed by payer type to
 
determine whether statistically significant differences in
 
preventable readmissions and deaths were evident. The data
 
were controlled by race, type of diagnosis, number of
 
diagnoses, and gender.
 
The overall statistical results revealed comparable
 
mortality and preventable readmission rates between the
 
Medi-Cal and HMO payer beneficiaries hospitalized during
 
1991. Medi-Cal beneficiaries experienced greater preventable
 
readmission rates in the patient age categories of 41 and
 
above. In these age categories, the average preventable
 
readmission rate of Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries was 35%,
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while the HMO rate was 23%, representing a differehce of
 
12%. Moreover, the mean age of Medi-Cal readmitted
 
beneficiaries (38) was 20% greater than the overall mean age
 
of all Medi-Cal beneficiaries (32).
 
In the results depicting all age categories, mortality
 
rates were nearly equal at 1% (370) of all Medi-Cal cases
 
and 1.06% (297) for all HMO cases. In addition, of the Medi-

Cal preventable readmission cases (370), 30.8% (114)
 
resulted in death; while of the HMO preventable readmission
 
cases (297), 25.3% (75) resulted in death. The preventable
 
readmission and mortality rates, coupled together with the
 
lower mean age of the Medi-Cal beneficiaries (32) when
 
compared to the HMO beneficiaries (41), would suggest that,
 
for overall ages, statistically insignificant differences
 
between Medi-Cal and HMO beneficiaries occurred.
 
When these data and analyses are used as measures of
 
the quality of care received during hospitalizations,
 
overall, Medi-Cal and HMO beneficiaries revealed similar
 
quality of care. The HMO cases depicted similar mortality
 
and preventable readmission rates although the mean lengths
 
of stay were 8% lower for the HMO beneficiaries. Also, the
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mean number of diagnoses and mean number of procedures were
 
similar.
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
 
Capitation: A method of paying for medical services on
 
a per-person rather than a per^proeedure basis.Under
 
capitation, an HMO pays a participating doctor a fixed
 
amount per month for every HMO member he or she takes care
 
of, regardless of how much or how little care the member
 
receives.
 
Copayment: A fixed payment the patient pays (usually in
 
the $5 to $25 range) each time he or she visits a health
 
plan clinician or receives a covered service.
 
Death: The cessation of the life of a living organism.
 
In this research, death is synonymous with mortality; which,
 
in this research, measures the cessation of life while a
 
patient in a hospital. More specifically, since hospital ^
 
discharge records are used, death and mortality are recorded
 
in the discharge record as the patient disposition. The
 
patient disposition is place to which the patient was
 
discharged. Therefore, the patients who have died while in
 
custody of the hospital have been discharged as a result of
 
their death.
 
Deductible: More typical in traditional health
 
insurance, a fixed amount the patient must pay each year
 
before the insurer will begin covering the cost of care.
 
Fee-for-service: The traditional method of paying for
 
medical services. A doctor charges a fee for each service
 
provided, and the insurer pays all or part of that fee.
 
Sometimes the patient pays a copaymerit for each yisit to the
 
'doctor.
 
'Health Maintenance Organization (HMO): An organization
 
that provides health care in return for pre-set monthly ,
 
payments. Most HMOs provide care through a network of
 
doctors, hospitals and other medical professionals that :
 
their members must use to be covered for that care. The term
 
health maintenance organization was first coined in the
 
early 1970s during the Nixon administration. There are
 
varying models of HMOs. These models include integrated
 
organizations that provide all types of services. Point of
 
Service (POS) models that allow varying patient cost sharing
 
for more flexibility, and Independent Practice Associations
 
(IPAs) which differ in how the physicians are organized and
 
paid. Ultimately however, the objective is to control costs.
 
Length of Stay (LOS): The number of days residing in
 
medical institution or hospital.
 
Managed Care Organization: An umbrella term for HMOs
 
and all health plans that provide health care in return for
 
pre-set monthly payments and coordinate care through a
 
defined network of:primary care physicians and hospitals.
 
Medi-Cal Payer beneficiaries: California Medicaid payer
 
beneficiaries. Medicaid is a state-federal cost-sharing
 
program that pays for certain health services of persons who
 
meet eligibility criteria based on income levels determiried
 
by the states. Medicaid is under the ^UspiceS of The
 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and
 
Administered by Health Care Finance Administration, which
 
was created by the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public
 
Health Services Amendments Act of 1966. Medi-Cal is under
 
the auspices of State of California Health and Welfare
 
Agency and administered by the Department of Health
 
Services.
 
Mortality: Death. In this research, mortality is coded
 
in the hospital discharge record under the field
 
'disposition'.
 
 : P The patient payer in thid research
 
represents the payer pian^m^;;which hhe beheficiaries.hSvev
 
indicateid in; their hospihal vrecoards; Although g can ; 
be underwritten by certain insurance companies or the / 
government, the payer pian in this research is the provider 
plan type, which is responsible for the direction of the ■ 
patient's health care services. 
Payer source: Is the entity responsible for paying the
 
health care bills. In this research, the payer sources
 
studied are Medi-Cal (Medicaid), HMO, and all others
 
combined. The Medi-Cal beneficiaries can be enrolled in
 
either managed ;care plans or fee-for-service plans. The
 
payer sources recorded in the hospital discharge records are
 
used in this study to measure the effects of HMO or Medi-Gal
 
fee-for-service plan types. It is thus the plan type, and
 
the risks associated with the plan's enrollment that is
 
measured in this research.
 
Per diem: The payment of services for a one-day period.
 
Point-of-Service (POS) plan: A type of HMO coverage
 
that allows members to choose to receive services either
 
from participating HMO providers, or from providers outside
 
the HMO's network, In-network eare is more fully covered;
 
for out-of-network care, members pay deductibles and a
 
percentage of the cost of care, much like traditional health
 
insurance coverage.
 
Practice guidelines: Carefully developed information on
 
diagnosing and treating specific medical conditions.
 
Practice guidelines, usually based on clinical literature
 
and expert consensus, are designed to help physicians and
 
patients make decisions, to help a health plan evaluate
 
appropriateness, and medical necessity of care.
 
<• Preferred Providet Organization (PPG): A network of
 
doctors and hospitals that provides care at a lower cost
 
than through traditional insurance. PPO members get better
 
benefits (more coverage) when they use the PPO's network,
 
and pay higher out-of-pocket costs when they receive care
 
outside the PPO network.
 
Preventable readmissions: Are defined as a
 
rehospitalization within one month of cases with the same
 
diagnosis and within the same hospital. The
 
rehospitalization cases were at the patient level.
 
Preventable readmissions, in this research, are considered
 
adverse outcomes because, when properly controlled, present
 
proximate measures of outcomes which may indicate underlying
 
deficiencies. Moreover, readmissions may lead to the
 
inefficient use of resources, greater patient suffering, and
 
missed opportunities.
 
Preventive care: Care designed to prevent disease
 
altogether, to detect and treat it early, or to manage its
 
course most effectively. Examples of preventive care include
 
immunizations and regular screenings as Pap smears or
 
chplesterol checks.
 
Primary care: Preventive health care and routine
 
medical care that is typically provided by a doctor trained
 
in internal medicine, pediatrics, or family practice, or by
 
a nurse, nurse practitioner or physician's assistant. ,
 
Primary care physician (PCP): A physician, usually an
 
internist, pediatrician or family physician, devoted to
 
general medical care of patients. Most HMOS require members
 
to choose a primary care physician, who is then expected to;
 
provide or authorize all care for that patient.
 
Quality of care is defined by the Institute of
 
Medicine's (lOM) Committee to Design a Strategy for Quality
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Review and Assurance in Medicare as: "Quality of care is the
 
degree to which health services for individuals and
 
populations increase the likelihood of desired health
 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional
 
knowledge. How care is provided should reflect appropriate
 
use Of the most current knowledge about scientific,
 
clinical, technical, interpersonal, manual, cognitive, and
 
organizational and management elements of health care (Lohr
 
1990, 4-5).In this research, the quality of care provided to
 
Medi-Cal and HMO payer plans is measured as the differences
 
in the rates of preventable readmissions and deaths.
 
Referral: A formal process that authorizes an HMO
 
member to get care from a specialist or hospital.
 
To assure coverage, an HMO patient generally must get a
 
referral from his or her primary care doctor before seeing a
 
specialist.
 
Specialist: A doctor or other health care professional
 
whose training and expertise are in a specific area of
 
medicine, like cardiology or dermatology. Most HMOs require
 
members to get a referral from their primary care physician
 
before seeing a specialist.
 
CHAPTER ONE -- STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
 
Introduction
 
The demands of international, competitiori, burgeohihg
 
government debts, and the high rates of health care
 
inflation have been deleterious to the number of insured
 
persons and the amount of funds available to those with
 
insurance. The increased international competition forced
 
r.S. companies to be more price-competitive. As companies
U.
 
sought ways to reduce costs, health care, which experienced
 
steep inflation during the past three decades, was an
 
increasingly prominent target for cost controls. As a large
 
and increasing portion of federal and state budgets, health
 
care was also targeted for cost containment. As a result,
 
both the private and public sectors sought ways to reduce
 
the rate of health care inflation without diminishing the
 
quality of care the beneficiaries may receive.
 
This research reviews the trend to enroll Medicaid
 
beneficiaries--specifically, California Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries--into Health Maintenance Organizations(HMO)
 
and the potential implications to the quality of care those
 
beneficiaries might receive.
 
The Medi-Cal populations have experienced gradual
 
introduction into managed care provider plans in the past;
 
however recently, the enrollment has progressed from
 
optional enrollment to mandatory enrollment. Since the
 
amendments to hhe 1935 Social Security Act that directed the
 
federal government to pay for health services to the over 65
 
population (Medicare) and the poor or disabled (Medicaid),
 
the programs have experienced tremendous growth in
 
beneficiaries and expenditures. Within two years of these
 
amendments, legislation to rationalize the health services
 
system began to materialize.
 
The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health
 
Service Amendments Act of 1966 (PL 89-749), sought to build
 
on planning processes and techniques required by the Hill
 
Burton Act of 1946. In 1972, Social Security Amendments (PL
 
92-603) were enacted to monitor the utilization and quality
 
of services provided under Medicare and Medicaid by using
 
professional standards review organizations (PSROs);
 
however, these PSROs were replaced by professional review
 
organizations.
 
In 1974, the National Health Planning and Resources
 
Development Act created greater control that planning ^
 
agencies had over health services.
 
As the federal and state governments became concerned
 
about the rate of health care inflation, methods for
 
reducing the rate of inflation were explored. The Tax Equity
 
and Fiscal Act of 1982 and the Social Security Amendments of
 
1983 established a prospective payment system as a method
 
for containing hospital costs. The rate of Medicare payments
 
would be paid prospectively and based on a mix of hospital
 
services in the form of diagnostic related groups (DRGs) and
 
means tested for weighting payments based on experiences by
 
area. Moreover, states began to control Medicaid
 
expenditures through arbitrary payment limits. It was the
 
intention of both state and federal governments to cause
 
hospitals to become more efficient. The need to control the
 
rise of health care expenditures precipitated the creation
 
of prospective payments, increased competition, and greater
 
risk sharing by health providers. (Rakich 1992)
 
Historically, Medi-Cal beneficiaries had the freedom of
 
choice to choose their providers.
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However, in recent years, greater mandatory enrollment
 
has been explored and realized. This usurpation of what had
 
been perceived as a right by beneficiaries prompted outcries
 
by libertarians and advocacy groups. The grass root's
 
efforts to ensure both governmental entitlement rights and
 
patient rights have galvanized public policy officials,
 
government lawmakers, and health care constituents.
 
During the 1980s, federal legislation had sought to
 
ease restrictions on the types of plans that could be
 
offered to the Medicare and Medicaid populations. In more
 
recent years, the federal government has adopted more
 
regulations that attempt to safeguard the Medicare and
 
Medicaid beneficiaries from the financial influences
 
attributable to HMOs. A primary concern of government
 
officials is that access, and thus quality of health care,
 
may be adversely effected as the result of greater
 
incentives to ration care based on a fixed budget.
 
The premises behind these federal actions stem from the
 
belief that Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are
 
disadvantaged in some way from the general insured
 
populations and that HMOs may potentially provide care that
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is deetned to be of lesser quality than the general insured
 
pppulation. It is the primary tenet of this research to
 
provide results that may lend evidence about the actual
 
differences in mortality and recidivism outcomes experienced
 
by California Medicaid beneficiaries enrblled into HMOs.
 
The potential risk of enrolling Medicaid/Medi payer
 
beneficiaries,in HMOs is poor qudlity of Health care,
 
measured by preventable readmission and mortality rates.
 
This research explored the differences among the 1991
 
California hospitalized HMO and Medi-Cal payer cases.
 
Purpose of the Study and Implications
 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether new
 
and current policy changes that propose to enroll greater
 
proportions of Medi-Cal beneficiaries into HMOs, would
 
adversely affect the hospitalization outcome risks of care
 
provided to Medi-Cal beneficiaries.
 
In this analysis, I used the variations of preventable
 
readmission and death rates between Medi-Cal and HMO payer
 
sources (as indicated in the patient records) as indicators
 
of outcomes and thus the quality of care. To determine
 
whether the risks of mortality and readmission were greater
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for HMO payer cases than the Medi-Cal payer cases, the
 
tespdctiye odds ratio# and re risks were computed.
 
These statistical measures compute whether excess risks
 
between the HMO and Medi-Cal payer sources existed.
 
The results of my analyses are synthesized into policy
 
recommendations.
 
Decade of Change
 
Health Care Costs
 
The U.S. health care inflation rate of 8% during the
 
1980s was significantly greater than the general inflation
 
rate of 4% during the same period. The specific inflation
 
rate of hospital and related services increased from 6.6% in
 
the 1950s and 1960s to over 11.5% in 1989.
 
In addition, hospitals represented 38% of total health
 
care costs and representing the largest single cost category
 
among all health care cost categories (Levit, Lazenby,
 
Cowan, and Letsch, 1991).
 
Public health expenditures, as a percentage of total
 
health care spending, have increased from 24.7% of overall
 
spending in 1965 to 42.0% in 1989. Increases in national
 
health expenditures as a percentage of gross national
 
  
 
 
prpduct grew from 5.9% in 1965 to 11.6% in 1989 (Levity
 
Lazenby, Cowan/ and letsch, 1991). /
 
Figure 1 Selected Gonsumer Price Index Trends
 
= 100)
 
200 
190 191.9 
180 
175.4 177 
I 170 
, 160 
150 
- 140. 
136.2 
® 130. 
X 120. 115:5^ 
110. 
1001 
90: 
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Years
 
Hospital Care All Medical -i--All Major Groups
 
The expenditures per capita increased from 1,068 to
 
3,094 in 1980 and 1992, respectiveiy.
 
The i992 amount represented an increase of 290% (U•S.
 
Department of Commerce, 1992). '
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Figure 2 Health GDP for Selected Years
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Figure 3 Health Care Expenditures per Capita for Selected
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Figiiire 4 shbws the hospital admission ,000 person
 
iri the 1990. The decrease in adinissioris :
 
per 1,000 is clearly evident (U.S. Department of Commerce,
 
Figure 4 Hospital Admissions per 1,000 for Selected Years
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Figure 5 Outpatient Visits per 1,000
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Figure 6 depicts measures of health status of the U.S.
 
compared with California in 1990.
 
Although California had the highest enrolled managed
 
care population, these health status data are favorable when
 
compared to the national data (U.S. Department of Commerce,
 
1992).
 
Figure 6 Measure of U.S. and California Health Status
 
Difference 1
 
(1990) U.S. California CA-US %Diff.
 
PercentofLowBirth Rates 7.05 5.85 -1.2 -17.0%,
 
Infant Deaths per1,000 7.5 -1.4 -15.7%'
 
Figure 7 shows the trend of overall and heart disease
 
specific death rates per 100,000 from 1980 through 1991.
 
17
 
 During this eleven-year period, overall mortality rates
 
improved from 585.8 to 513.7 deaths per 100,000 (12%
 
improvement).
 
Heart disease--single most costly disease in the U.S.-­
deaths per 100,000 improved from 202.0 to 148.2 during the
 
same period (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992).
 
Figure 7 U.S. Age Adjusted Death Rates per 100,000
 
Age Adjusted Death Rates per 100,000 Persons in the U.S.
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The health care rate of inflation coupled with 
increases in government programs, greater entitlement 
participation, and mounting concerns about government budget 
deficits demanded the development and implementation of 
serious cost containment measures. However, the demands for 
access and the best possible quality of health care made the 
development and implementation of these measures very 
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difficult. The scarcity of resources motivates us to choose
 
both how much and to whom services should be made.
 
Managed Care ,
 
Since 1973, the federal government has promoted
 
legislation to gain greater acceptance of managed care.
 
A major financing mechanism that has been evaluated and
 
demonstrated by many states is a capitated risk system. The
 
principles of capitated payments are payment of a fixed
 
amount per member per month to a provider, with the provider
 
assuming or sharing financial risk attributed to the care
 
given to those beneficiaries. In many capitated payment
 
arrangements, the provider is part of an IPA or medical
 
group, and the premium per member per month is divided among
 
physician services, hospital services, and certain carve-out
 
services such as behavioral, pharmaceutical, and vision
 
care. Providers typically strive for payments in excess of
 
costs through controlled utilization and efficient
 
management of the continuum of care.
 
Managed care is an epiphenomenon of private sector
 
prepaid plans dating back over 60 years. Prominent early
 
prepaid plans included the 1937 Group Health Association in
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Washington, DC, the 1942 Kaiser Perraanente Medical Care
 
Program, the 1947 Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound in
 
Seattle, the 1947 Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York,
 
and the 1957 Group Health Plan of Minneapolis.
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, prototype prepaid
 
variations named IPAs (Independent Practitioner
 
Associations) began to arise. During the early 1970s, Health
 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) increasingly became a
 
significant force in the medical industry. In addition to
 
HMOs, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) began evolving
 
and growing. The primary differences between the HMO and PPO
 
organizational forms were the lack of PPO mechanisms for
 
assuring cost and quality controls. Although many of the
 
pre-admission certification and retrospective reviews
 
existed between the two managed care forms, the real
 
difference was in the risk for the patient's health care
 
needs. The HMO was primarily paid per member per month and
 
was responsible for all levels of patient care. The HMO act
 
of 1973 enabled and promoted health maintenance
 
organizations to expand enrollment as a result of grants.
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contraGts, loans, and overall synergism created by
 
government bureaucracies (Knogsvedt, 1995).
 
HMOs assumed responsibility for providing a
 
comprehensive range of health services to enrolled
 
populations at a fixed premium. The HMOs were at financial
 
risk because the payments were a fixed amount per member,
 
regardless of the amount of health services used. The HMOs
 
would risk cpntract with physician groups, usually
 
independent physician associations (IPA) and medical groups
 
to provide the care for a fixed amount per member per month
 
after deducting their administrative and profit margins. The
 
majority of physicians in California today belong to some
 
form of organized group like an IPA. The physicians retain
 
somS individual medical p^ectice autonomy while sharing the
 
financial risks and rewards of the overall IPA. In this way,
 
the physicians have financial responsibility for the groups'
 
costs, but can cohesively negotiate for health plan
 
enrollees.
 
The physicians receive incentives to manage the care
 
provided to beneficiaries by sharing the risk of over-

utilization and rewards of under-utilization. This method
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contrasts the traditional fee-for-service method of enticing
 
providers to use services.
 
-T^One consequence of these new incentives was the
 
decrease in hospital inpatient episodes and length of stays,
 
and an increase in the lower cost outpatient episodes. The
 
primary responsibility of patient care continues to reside
 
with the physicians. This responsibility for the types and
 
duration of care the physician's control has made them the
 
focus for managed care. The physician groups in California
 
have been predominantly contracted by HMOs to accept a
 
capitated PMPM for a defined set of both institutional
 
(hdspital) and professional (physician) care.
 
Within most of the HMO and physician contracts reside
 
incentives to ensure both cost effective care and quality
 
care.|The physicians typically agree to accept a rate that
 
has been actuarially calculated based on the historical
 
costs associated with both the areas and demographic
 
characteristics that comprise the beneficiary population.
 
The contracts between HMOs and providers however, include
 
provisions for monitoring the quality of care that patients
 
perceive.
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The opportunities inherent for both the HMO and the
 
physician group are to manage care below the historical
 
utilization rates and maintain patient satisfaction for
 
continued plan enrpllment.
 
In addition to the physician's responsibility to manage
 
the intensity and frequency of health Care provisions, the
 
HMOs endeavor to negotiate better-contracted hospital per
 
■diem rates. 
The Preferred Provider Organizational (PPO) form of a 
managed care firm has also affected utilizatipn and costs. 
The PPO attempts to negotiate the greatest savings from both 
institutional and professional providers for a defined 
population, and then shares the cost savings with contracted 
employer groups. Moreover, PPOs offer a variety of case —­
management and referral policies.that manages entry by 
beneficiaries to the type, frequency, and intensity of 
services. In some case management agreements, the PPO may 
also follow the care through all care processes to ensure 
appropriateness within internal and external medical 
guidelines. 
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The PPO in simple form is a contraGtual relationship
 
between health care pro^/iders, institutions, employers,
 
insurance firms, and third party administrators to provide
 
health care services at a discounted rate.
 
The private sector recognized the cost effectiveness of
 
the new HMO model and enrollment growth during the past ten
 
years has been significant. In 1994, there were 55 million
 
HMO enrollees (ICongsvedt, 1995). In addition, enrollment in
 
PPOs grew from 0 in: the 1970s, to 74 million by December
 
1991. There were many changes in the U.S. that caused the
 
enormous growth in managed health care.
 
Medical practices transitioned from private to group
 
practices, corporations became more cost conscious, health
 
care providers become more specialized, the prevalence of
 
indemnity insurance enticed over-utilization, and Medicare
 
and Medicaid laws prompted significant increases in teaching
 
and investor owned hospitals (Brown, 1993).
 
Cost Controls""
 
HMOs have been operating under the simple premise that
 
they can control costs and improve the quality of care.
 
24
 
However, the true dimensions of cost control and quality of
 
care are far from simple. How costs are limited is a key
 
element for the successful outcome of care.
 
Common methods for controlling utilization in managed
 
care organizations include prospective, concurrent, and
 
retrospective reviews. In prospective reviews, admitting
 
physicians may pre-certify the patient to ensure appropriate
 
care, begin the scheduling tasks, prepare discharge planning
 
systems, and,capture financial and operational data. The
 
pre-certification process provides the structure for
 
organizing care efficiently and medically appropriately.
 
In some cases, utilization management may receive
 
queues about incoming patients so that clinical and
 
administrative protocdls can be followed. Also, pre­
certification verifies and ensures compliance with insurance
 
and regulatory guidelines.
 
Concurrent review is the management of utilization
 
during the course of health care. Some of the techniques
 
employed are tracking of length of stay, UM Nurse review,
 
and discharge planning.
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The review process may include maximum lengths of stay,
 
level of treatment (inpatient, outpatient, partial,
 
structured), and medical appropriateness.
 
In addition, concurrent review allows administration to
 
efficiently manage work loads and'resource utilization.
 
Retrospective review occurs after the case is finished
 
and the patient is-; d Rietrospective reyiew includes
 
claims examination and episode evaluation. The claims review
 
process adjudicates mistakes, improprieties, and seeks to
 
optimize billing.
 
The retrospective process reviews claims to ensure that
 
third party liability payment sources are identified
 
(maximizing collections), optimal billings for procedures
 
are made (maximizing revenues), fraud is minimized, and
 
errors are minimized. The pattern or episode review
 
component examines utilization and compares them with
 
industry, internal, and regional normative data to
 
reengineer existing methods to achieve optimal outcomes. It
 
continuously evaluates industry methods and normative data
 
to internal patterns of care to make internal changes as
 
necessary.
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Medicaid and California's Medi-Cal
 
Medicaid Background
 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act is a Federal-State
 
matching entitlement program that provides medical
 
assistance for certain individuals and families with low
 
incomes and resources.
 
This program, known as Medicaid, became law in 1965 as
 
a jointly funded cooperative venture between the federal and
 
state governments to assist States in the provision of more
 
adequate medical care to eligible needy persons.
 
Medicaid is the largest program providing medical and
 
health related services to America's poorest people. Each
 
state establishes its eligibility standards; determine the
 
type, amount, duration, scope Of services, and parent for
 
services; and administer its program (Dallek, 1994).
 
Subsequent to their enactment, both Medicare and
 
Medicaid had been subject to numerous legislative and
 
administrative changes that continually sought, within
 
financial considerations, to make improvements in the
 
provision of health care services to the elderly and poor.
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since 1965, growth in health care expenditures has
 
consistently outpaced growth in geheral revenues for all
 
levels of government, and has been the precursor to these
 
changes (Dallek, 1994)v ;
 
Health and medical care are funded through a variety of
 
private payers and public programs. For each year from 1975
 
through 1990, private funds paid for 58 to 60 percent of all
 
health care expenditures in the U.S. By 1993, the proportion
 
paid by private funds had dropped to 56.1 percent (Dallek,
 
1994).
 
The public share of health care expenditures has
 
steadily increased over the past five years from 40.2
 
percent in 1988, to 43.9 percent in 1993.
 
The largest shares of public health expenditures are
 
for the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which in 1993,
 
accounted for 30.8 percent of the total health care spending
 
in the U.S. (By comparison, 17.8 percent of all national
 
health care spending comes from consumers in out-of-pocket
 
expenditures and 33.5 percent is reimbursed by private
 
health insurance. (Dallek, 1994).
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Medicare and Medicaid expenditures represented 70.2
 
percent of all publicly funded health care spending in the
 
U. S. during 1993, with Medicare responsible for 40 percent
 
and Medicaid responsible for 30 percent. The 1994 FY
 
Medicare and Medicaid program expenditures for delivery of
 
services and program administration were reported at $297.5
 
billion (UiS. Department of Commerce, 1992),
 
There is a minimum federal set of standards for health
 
care services that must be met. The federal medical
 
assistance percentage (FMAP) is used to determine the share
 
of the federal government's expenditure for each state
 
(Winterbottom, 1995). States determine Medicaid eligibiiity
 
based on many factors, with the most important criteria
 
being income and financial resources.
 
The minimum eligibility criteria and benefits are developed
 
by each state and vary moderately.
 
The government pays a percentage of the state's
 
expenditures based on the annual per capita income in the
 
state compared to the national average per capita income.
 
If a state per capita income is below the national per
 
capita income, the range of federal reimbursement is 55 to
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83 percent. If the state per capita income is equal to the
 
national per capita income,: the federalv^^^^^^^^ is 55
 
percent. If the state's per capita income is above the
 
national per capita income, the reindJursement is: frott 50 to
 
55 percent. In 1981, iiheOmhibus Budget RScbhciliatiohA^
 
reduced the payment by 3 percent in 1982, 4 percent in 1983,
 
and 4.5 percent in 1984 (Dallek, 1994). ;
 
The states could however reduce the cutbacks if they
 
instituted cost review programs, if unemployment was equal
 
to or greater than 150 percent of the national rate, and if
 
state anti-fraud activities recovered 1 percent or more of
 
the federal payments. The reason for reducing the payments
 
was due to health care inflation rates that were of great
 
concern to the Congress.
 
The Congress however, did not wish to restrict payments
 
to a level that would deter providers from providing care t6
 
Medicaid beneficiaries (Winterbottom, 1995).
 
The law does not permit the Federal Government to
 
exercise supervision or control over the practice of
 
medicine, the manner in which medical services are provided,
 
and the administration or operation of medical facilities.
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Facilities desiring to participate in the Medicare or
 
Medicaid program must meet participation conditions for
 
cCftifiCatipn. State agencies certify to the DHHS indicating
 
whether hospitals, SNFs, HHAs, independent laboratories,
 
pprtabie X-ray faCiiities, and pfovid,efs furnishing searvices
 
satisfy, and continue to satisfy, their respective
 
conditions of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid
 
programs.
 
The Secretary of the DHHS certifies facilities
 
requesting participation in both the Medicare and Medicaid
 
programs. States certify those facilities that request
 
participation in the Medicaid program only.
 
The state function of making certifications is intended
 
to be a natural adjunct to ongoing state activities (such as
 
the licensing of health care facilities and the setting of
 
standards).
 
A state coordinates with other state programs that
 
involve payment for health care, quality of care, and
 
distribution of health facilities.
 
Coordination of these activities is essential in
 
assuring effective and economical use of existing state
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facilities and trained personnel and to prevent duplication
 
of effort. Where a state enters into an agreement with the
 
Government to pay: the medical insurance premium on behalf of
 
its aged welfare recipients, the agreement may provide for a
 
designated state agency to serve as an intermediary on
 
behalf of- its welfare:recipients (Kongstvedt, 1995).
 
Medicaid sp^ is expected to grow faster than the
 
economy as a whole and faster than State and Federal
 
revenues, just like general health care spending. According
 
to the Congressional Budget Office (CBQ); Medic is
 
expected to grow between 10 and 11 perpent annuall^^^ during
 
the next six years.: This growth rate is more than twice the
 
rate of economic growth and inflation.^^^^; ^
 
In the 1995 fiscal year, the combined Federal a^^
 
governments spent $158 billion and are expected to spend
 
$262 billion by fiscal year 2000 (Congressional Budget
 
Office 1995).
 
Moreover, the age distributions of the Medicaid
 
populations are expected to be concentrated in the elderly
 
categories during the next five to ten years. The care
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provided to the elderly has historically been more costly
 
than the younger populations.
 
As a result of the aging compositidrl of the Medicaid
 
benefiGiaries, coupled with the expected indre^a in
 
enrollment into Medicaid, the costs are expected to rise
 
more sharply than in the past (Gdngressional pudget Offide
 
1995).
 
Although in 1993 the Medicaid program represented only
 
6 percent of Federal spending, it represented the greatest
 
share of the State budgets--12.8 percent. California
 
spending increased by an enormous 23 percent from 1992 to
 
1993 increased, while the enrollment only increased 7
 
The Medicaid program has grown from $ 250 million in
 
1965 to over $ 92 billion by 1992. When the law was
 
implemented, it was estimated that around 2.3 million
 
individuals would be enrolled at any certain time. However,
 
in 1991 over 28 million people were enrolled. These
 
escalating costs and growth rates have prompted lawmakers to
 
formulate new ways to provide quality care while reducing
 
the cost of Medicaid.
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Cost sharing, DRGs, reimbursement ihcentives and ;
 
disincentives, contracted coverage,; and voluntary managed
 
care enrollments have helped reduce the rate of inflation.
 
However, these measures still fail to Contrpl growth to an
 
acceptable level (Kongstvedt, 1995).
 
All of these factors, linked together with Federal
 
spending reduction pressures, suggest that Medicaid funds
 
may diminish even further in California. The concern is that
 
the quality of care--access, satisfaction, outcomes--may be
 
sensitive to these spending reductions (Congressional Budget
 
Office 1995). ^
 
The cause of increases in Medicaid spending can be
 
illustrated by three main factors: the utilization of
 
services (types and frequencies); the cost changes of
 
services; and the number and characteristics of the
 
individuals eligible for services (age, gender, location,
 
quantities). In addition, since States receive a portion of
 
Medicaid spending reimbursed from the Federal government,
 
they have recently sought to maximize those reimbursements
 
through disproportionate care hospital (DSH) payments.
 
During 1989 through 1992, Federal DSH payments to States
 
34
 
grew by 2,400 percent. The states had pursued greater DSH
 
payments through strategic spending and taxing and resulted
 
in further exacerbated of the Medicaid inflation rates. The
 
reaction by the Federal government was, however, to mitigate
 
increases by enacting legislation in 1991 and 1993
 
(Congressional Budget Office 1995).
 
, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981
 
mandated some of the most significant changes in the
 
Medicaid program since its beginnings in 1965. The 1981 OBRA
 
had sought to limit the rapid Medicaid cost growth by
 
setting new limits on eligibility for the program, reduced
 
the Federal share of the program costs, and increased the
 
state's ability to manage the program, Prior to the 1981
 
OBRA, state's paid hospitals on a reasonable cost basis.
 
However, the 1981 OBRA not only forced eligibility cutbacks
 
on the states, but also eliminated the federal requirement
 
for reimbursement of all 'reasonable' hospital costs. This
 
had the effect of encouraging states to adopt prospective
 
payment systems. Moreover, the federal matching was reduced
 
by 3 percent in 1982, 4 percent in 1983, and 4.5 percent in
 
1984.
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To further encourage cost control by the states,
 
reductions were minimized for those states with effective
 
cost controls and higher than national average unemployment
 
rates.
 
Also arising from the 1981 OBRA was increased
 
flexibility for administering the Medicaid program by
 
eliminating various federal restrictions and allowing
 
waivers. As a result, states began to examine the use of
 
HMOs and other prepayment health care delivery systems.
 
The economic contractions during the early 1980s,
 
together with federal pressures to reduce the escalating
 
Medicaid expenditures, caused the states to pursue methods
 
for cost reductions or slowed cost growth. The method that
 
has culminated from these efforts to explore new cost
 
containment is the prospective payment system (PPS).
 
Proponents of PPS contend that it contains costs by
 
stimulating efficiency in the delivery system. Also, early
 
studies revealed lower hospital per diem rates for skilled
 
nursing and intermediate care without adverse effects to
 
access and outcomes (Buchanan 1987)
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The trend to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries into managed
 
care plans may largely be the reaction to continued
 
increases in Medicaid expenses.
 
In 1996, over 32 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries
 
were enrolled in managed care (Health Care Financing
 
Administration, 1996). Between 1990 and 1995, enrollment
 
into managed care plans increased over 400 percent. Also>
 
1995, 43 States had some form of Medicaid managed care
 
initiative.
 
By 1994,:forty-three states and the District of
 
Columbia had a Medicaid managed care program either
 
implemented or in the demonstration phase.
 
The HMOs provide beneficiaries with a specific package
 
of benefits in exchange for a fixed, per capita, prepaid
 
premium. The prepayments to HMOs provide the states with
 
predictable and easier payments. In addition, the state's
 
receipt of claims for individual services could be
 
eliminated and could thereby reduce administrative costs.
 
The capitated premium per member per month (PMPM)
 
accommodates more predictable budgets because maximum
 
liability is establish in advance.
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The required to monitor the program and also
 
accept financial risk for the enrollees. As part of the
 
monitdrihg responsibilities, HMOs must evaluate and ensure
 
the quality of care the enrollees receive. The HMOs are
 
accountable to the states, federal government, and third
 
party monitoring agencies such as the National Committee for
 
Quality Assurance (NCQA).
 
The NCQA developed a voluntary health plan performance
 
measurement tool called the Health Plan Employer Data and
 
Information Set (HEDIS).
 
This performance measurement tool provides health plan
 
utilization data for selected procedures, and information on
 
enrollment, access, quality assessment and improvement, and
 
enrollee satisfaction. In addition, other quality assurance
 
and improvement systems for Medicaid managed care were
 
developed under the Quality Assurance Reform Initiative
 
(QARI) during 1991-1993.
 
In 1989, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
 
(AHCPR) was created to enhance the quality, appropriateness,
 
and effectiveness in health care services. AHCPR began
 
developing Patient Outcome Research Teams (PORTS) used to
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study diseases and clinicai practice guidelines. These
 
guidelines and efforts were intended to be yet another tool
 
for measuring the quality of care.
 
HCFA had collaborated with states, health plans, and
 
other drganizations to develop a system intended to improve
 
oversight of Medicaid managed-care quality. (U.S. Department
 
of Health and Human Services, 1993). The QARI initiative
 
consisted of voluntary guidelines for managed care health
 
plans and states to use when contracting for Medicaid.
 
Both the QARI and HEDIS tools provide useful
 
information for plan evaluation.
 
The common goal among these and other evaluation tools
 
is to monitor the quality of care by using valid, efficient,
 
effective, and standard instruments.
 
Federal laws mandate states to monitor the Medicaid
 
managed care plans to ensure quality care (42 USC
 
1396a(a)(30)) and to cohduct annual audits of contracted
 
plans (42 CFR 434.53). The audits must be conducted by peer
 
review organizations or independent bodies.
 
The experience of the early prepaid group practices,
 
which served as HMO prototypes, revealed reduced costs
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without reducing the quality of care. The organizational
 
biehefits of the prepaid^ ■group and the f inancial . 
incentives to the physicians encouraged the reduction of 
medically unnecessary care. The purpose for quality of care 
regulations-both self determined and legally mandated--is to 
safeguard the beneficiaries from the potentially deleterious 
restriction of necessary care. 
States determine the amount and duration of services 
offered under their Medicaid programs. They may limit the 
number of days of hospital care or the number of physician 
visits covered. However, states are prohibited from limiting 
the duration of coverage for medically necessary inpatient . 
hospital services provided to Medicaid-eligible children 
under age six who are in disproportionate share hospitals or 
to infants in all hospitals. ■ 
State Medicaid Plans must allow recipients to have 
freedom of choice among participating providers of health 
care. States may provide and pay for Medicaid services 
through various pre-payment arrangements, such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) . 
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Payment for Medicaid Services
 
The Federal government shares in the state's
 
expenditures for administration of the Medicaid program.
 
Most administrative costs are matched at 50 percent.
 
However, depending on the complexities and the need for
 
incentives for a particular service, higher matching rates
 
are paid for certain functions and activities.
 
Federal Medicaid payments to states have no set limit.
 
The federal government provides the state payments for the
 
mandatory services plus the optional services that the state
 
decides to provide for eligible beneficiaries.
 
States must also pay additional amounts to qualified
 
hospitals that provide inpatient services to a
 
disproportionate number of Medicaid recipients and to other
 
low-income persons under what is known as the
 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program.
 
The U.S. Congress, the Department of Health and Human
 
Services, and the individual states continually seek to make
 
improvements in the Medicaid programs' quality,
 
effectiveness and extent of health care services. However,
 
the Medicaid programs must function within the various
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Federal arid state economic, social, and political factors
 
constraints.
 
The growth in Medicaid benefiGiaries clearly depicts
 
the growing needs due to recessions, slowed economic growth,
 
and underlying social problems.
 
The risk is that financial pressure to reduce Medicaid
 
funding and subsequent lowered reimbursemerittO providers
 
may create poor quality care. The Medicaid reimbursement
 
rates for risk contracting are far below the private
 
reimbursement rates (Dallek, 1994).
 
If inflation continues to climb rapidly in the private
 
sector while the public Medicaid funds continue to rise very
 
slowly, insurers and providers could be forced to either
 
subsidize Medicaid beneficiaries or develop a two-tier
 
provider system. A two-tier system could be comprised of
 
lower cost services and procedures for lower paid Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries; while higher cost services and procedures may
 
be made available for higher paying plans.
 
The situation in California is particularly troublesome
 
because of the slow economic growth, high influx of
 
immigration, increased budget pressures, and already low per
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capita Medicaid expenditures. In 1993, California had the
 
greatest number of Medicaid enrollees (13.5 million) and the
 
lowest per capita Medicaid spending ($2,090 per person).
 
States have options that allow innovative approaches to
 
financing and delivering Medicaid services. Since 1981,
 
Federal waivers have been developed to allow states to
 
enroll Medicaid beneficiaries into HMOs and home and
 
community systems of care.
 
Effective utilization management of Medicaid
 
populations is essential. The Medicaid populations are
 
generally sicker, while states will, in most cases, contract
 
with providers at rates less than commercial plans. In
 
addition, some states mandate more comprehensive educational
 
and preventative services than commercial plans.
 
Traditionally, disenrollment rates are very high because of
 
the nature of Medicaid eligibility. In addition, systems for
 
monitoring eligibility must be in place to evaluate and
 
update changing eligibility.
 
HMO's may reduce the length of stay, limit high
 
technology, institute indirect and direct barriers to care,
 
changes service mixes, shift costs to other insured, reduce
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ancillaries, and provicie different gualities of care as a
 
way to reduce costs.
 
If the effects are poor guality of care to the Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries, in the long term, savings from increased HMO
 
enrollment may not exist. This problem poses questions for
 
policy makers. Will the increased enrollment of Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries in HMOs yield improvements in care and costs?
 
Moreover, will verification mechanisms be in place to assure
 
quality, efficacious, and cost effective care.
 
Alternatively, the continued lack of policies,
 
verification mechanisms, and regulation that exist today may
 
yield adverse outcomes for Medi-Cal beneficiaries.
 
A proposed method for linking the quality of care
 
dimensions with Medi-Cal reimbursement policies has been
 
proposed by The Center for Health Care Rights that would, in
 
their proposal, influence the way in which care is provided
 
to the Medi-Cal populations enrolled in HMOs.
 
During the early 1980S, sweeping Medicaid reductions
 
took place. Benefits and payments were reduced. However,
 
during the late 1980s, Medicaid expansion took place.
 
Between 1984 and 1990, more than a half million pregnant
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women, five million children, and millions of elderly and
 
disabled became^eligible for Medicaid,. "
 
As a result, the early 1990s saw great concern fob the
 
growth of Medicaid expenditures. ;
 
The challenges of providing quality care while dbiyipg;
 
down inflation in the health care system in the dountry ahd
 
the state have become more polarized in recent decades.
 
Since the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA),
 
Medicaid risk contracting grew from 1 percent to over 4
 
percent in 1990. By 1995, HCFA reports show 3 million (14%)
 
Medicaid enrollees in managed care plans.
 
According to research that measures the effects of a
 
prepaid group practice on services and the effectiveness of
 
care, quality of care does not diminish if Medicaid
 
beneficiaries are enrolled in a large HMO containing private
 
beneficiaries. However, smaller HMOs have less ability to
 
spread the costs across a greater population and therefore
 
attempt to compensate for the lower reimbursement rates by
 
reducing medical care services. Data show that the average
 
length of stay for all patients has been reduced over the
 
past 12 years. The concern is that the Medicaid patient
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average length of stay has decreased at a greater rate
 
(Rice, 1996).
 
In California, 1992 and 1993 audits of managed care
 
providers revealed numerous deficiencies.
 
The audits analyze and present findings about how well
 
managed care plans meet state access and quality standards.
 
Also, the audits measure the degree to which findings
 
improve care.
 
The audits evaluated the following areas: quality and
 
continuity of care, medical records, plan administration,
 
grievances, pharmacy services, human reproductive
 
sterilization, licensure, facility review, scope of
 
services, and infection control. The audits rated each area
 
from 1, no deficiency, to 5, severe deficiency (Dallek,
 
1994).
 
The findings of the managed care plans revealed serious
 
quality of care problems in 14 of 15 medical audits.
 
Moreover, the quality of care findings had no impact on
 
subsequent years. Of the 4 PHP managed care plans audited,
 
all had "significant" or "major deficiency" citations. Two
 
of the four had significant deficiencies in access. Three of
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the four had significant deficiencies in continuity of care.
 
Two of the four were cited for significant basic pharmacy.
 
There was one PHP plan that had worsened significantly after
 
the audit instead of improving.
 
The citations were for significant irregularities and
 
not minor infractions (Dallek, 1994).
 
In addition to the aforementioned citations, the
 
managed care plans experienced high turnover rates. All
 
plans except Kaiser experienced double-digit disenrollment
 
rates for the years in which they were audited. Two of the
 
plans experienced turnover rates in excess of 100%.
 
Disenrollement may result from one or many reasons.
 
The first subject of interest is the marketing methods
 
employed by the managed care organizations (Dallek, 1994).
 
Galifornia has allowed door-to-door and welfare office
 
solicitations of the managed care plans. AlSo, commission
 
incentives have been provided for sales agents to enroll as
 
many as possible.
 
According to a 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO)
 
review, "Marketing can be used to educate beneficiaries
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about health plans, but it can also be used to Goerce
 
beneficiaries and gain their enrollment."
 
There have been numerous complaints during the past
 
several years concerning these marketing practices.
 
In fact, the Medi-Cal beneficiaries may have heightened
 
expectation about the new benefit plan, only to be inflated
 
by the unfamiliarity of managed care (Dallek, 1994).
 
The DHS maintains records of the reasons given for
 
disenrollment. According to the 1993 data for disenrollment
 
reasons, the top five reasons in order were: general ;
 
dissatisfaction, preference of FFS, no reason,
 
transportation, and prior care.
 
The problem in California is the accelerated desire to
 
enroll half of the Medi-Cal beneficiaries in an HMO by the
 
end of 1996. The,audits, literature, and evidence suggest
 
that policies, procedures, clear guidelines, and
 
infrastructure do not exist to ensure the level of care that
 
would meet the federal and state statutes. The audits
 
examined many recent years up to 1993, without depicting
 
significant improvements (Dallek, 1994).
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' In 1992, the federal Health Care Financing
 
Administration (HCFA) reviewed California's administration
 
of its managed care program and concluded:
 
"The administrative demands of keeping such a
 
large, highly visible program in place while
 
being subjected to unprecedented growth have
 
not unexpectedly eroded the efficacy of day
 
to day contractor oversight, technical
 
assistance, and communication, ultimately
 
impacting the program's Medi-Cal Customers.
 
As a result, it appears that the quality of a
 
contractor's performance depended more on its
 
own internal integrity and competency than on
 
the guidance and supervision of the state.
 
There was also an unevenness in the degree of
 
state supervision and quality of
 
communications with the plans, dependent on
 
the level of experience, expertise, and
 
active involvement of the different state
 
; contract managers." (HCFA, 1993)
 
HCFA further suggests that the state of California
 
limit and prioritize the expansion of managed care. However,
 
the state has ignored the suggestion and has begun massive
 
managed care expansion.
 
The increased debate about enrolling Medicaid and
 
Medicare beneficiaries into Health Maintenance Organizations
 
has raised concern about methods for monitoring the quality
 
of care those beneficiaries can expect.
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The diemand budget deficits at the
 
federal and state levels;has forced policy makers to explore
 
ways to reduce government expenditures.
 
Since Medicaid and Medicare represent a large portion
 
of government expenditures and have experienced inflation ;i
 
rates greater than the general inflation rate, the
 
governments have targeted them for cost savings.
 
To ensure that Medicaid and Medicare populations are
 
provided quality care while reducing costs, agencies are
 
evaluating methods for monitoring the outcomes and quality
 
of care. Two measures currently used are preventable
 
readmission and mortality rates. Preventable readmission to
 
a hospital shortly following a previous discharge may be
 
viewed as an adverse outcome of care because of the added
 
direct financial costs to the payer, costs attributable to
 
the patient's added suffering, and the costs of missed
 
opportunities.
 
If the quality of the care is insufficient to ensure
 
that the patient has stabilized to a state that would
 
significantly increase the chances of healing, the patient
 
may become more ill or secondary adverse harm could occur as
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a result, and thus the patient may require readmission to
 
the hospital. Moreover, the financial pressures to reduce
 
lengths of stay may unwittingly or intentionally cause
 
patients to be discharged more quickly than required for
 
appropriate observations and healing..
 
The advent of a readmission to hospital care is
 
considered undesirable because it potentially allocates
 
scarce resources that would have otherwise been expended on
 
other care. In other words, it is inefficient and may have
 
resulted in missed opportunities. Also, readmissions may be
 
the outcome of deficient operations and structural segments
 
of a hospital. Prior research has also suggested greater
 
costs in patient suffering and ancillary damage to a
 
patient's health as a result of the linkages to early
 
discharge and the subsequent readmission. As a result,
 
preventable readmissions can be used to monitor the quality
 
of care (Jones 1986).
 
In addition, mortality rates can serve to measure the
 
performance across different hospitals and payer plans.
 
Death is considered an adverse outcome because it is the
 
result which health care institutions wish to mitigate the
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most. Deaths are also most clearly discernible and carry the
 
least interpretive bias. When properly controlled, mortality
 
rates can be proximate outcome measures for identifying and
 
targeting institutions or payer plans that, for some reason,
 
may have underlying deficiencies as their causes.
 
Table 1 depicts California and national health care
 
utilization data, HMO membership information, and government
 
expenditure data from 1991. The California cost per patient
 
day was 31% greater than the U.S., average. The average
 
hospital cost per stay in California was 12% higher than the
 
national average. The California average length of stay
 
(ALOS) was one day less than the national average (5.6
 
versus 6.6, respectively).
 
California expended 10% less per capita for hospital
 
care and 27% more per capita for physician care. This may
 
reflect the lower hospitalization rates and higher
 
outpatient rates.
 
California also had fewer hospital beds per 1,000
 
persons (2.5) compared with the national number (3.5).
 
Moreover, California had 8% more physicians per 1,000
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persons and 29% fewer admissions per 1,000 in 1991 (U.S.
 
Department of Commerce, 1992).
 
The HMO data shqw- 107% greatei- enrpilment per 1,000
 
into California HMOs (317.7) than the national rate (153.7).
 
Also, the 9.8 million enrollees represent 25% of the overall
 
national HMO enrollment, while California represented 12% of
 
the national population in 1991 (Winterbottom, 1995).
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Table 1 U.S. and California Utilization Comparisons
 
Description(1991) U.S. California Diff. CA - % Diff.
 
U.S.
 
COSTS
 
Hospital Cost per Patient $914 $1,199 $285 31.2%
 
Day >
 
Hospital Cost per Stay $5,786 $6,470 $684 11.8%
 
Expenditure per Capita for $1,134 $1,025 -$109 -9.6%
 
Hospital Care
 
Expenditure per Capita for $598 $761 $163 27.3%
 
Physician Services
 
Hospital. Beds per 1,000 3.5 2.5 -1.0 -28.6%
 
population
 
Admissions per 1,000 125.3 102.5 -22.8 -18.2%
 
Inpatient Days per Admission 6.6 5.6 -1.0 -15.2%
 
Physicians per 1,000 247.2 267.5 20.3 8.2%
 
HMO MEMBERSHIP:
 
HMOs 556.0 46.0
 
HMO Members <1,000> 38,768 9^769
 
Members per 1,000 153.7 317.7 164.0 106.7%
 
GENERAL REVENUES: ^ ;
 
Revenue per Capita $3,578 $2,966 -$612 -17.1%
 
STATE & LOCAL TAX & REVENUE SOURCES
 
$ per Capita $2,083 $2,283 $200 9.6%
 
% from Individual Income 20.8% 24.3% 3.5% 16.8%
 
Taxes
 
% from Corporate & Other 11.9% 12.9% 1.0% 8.4%
 
Taxes
 
GENERAL EXPENDITURES
 
$ per Capita ; $3,590 $3,978 $388 10.8%
 
Expenditure % Education 34.2% 31.9% -2.3% -6.7%
 
Expenditure % Welfare 14.0% 14.4% 0.4% 2.9%
 
Expenditure % 9.0% 9.1% 0.1% 1.1%
 
Hea11h/Hospita1s . \ ' V ■ ' ^
 
Expenditure % 8.2% 10.3% 2.1% 25.6%
 
Police/Corrections
 
Expenditure % Highways 7.2% 4.6% -2.6% -36.1%
 
Expenditure % Other 27.4% 29.7% 2.3% 8.4%
 
Table 2 shows selected U.S., and California health care
 
spending and utilization (Winterbottom, 1995).
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 Table 2 Select U.S. and California Expenditure Data
 
DesGription U.S. California
 
HEALTH CARE SPEHDING IN fILLiONS;(19:90):
 
■'Government':; ' . 'GSG..9 53.0% 
■ Public ■ ' ■ ' - -y- ' '282,.^6 ■ 42.4%. 
■Other■ ' ■■ ■■■ V, ■; ■;■ ■ ;■■ ' ■:" ' ■■ .^ ■,;"■ ''■■ '■■ ■, ■ . / ' ■ ■■■ " ■ ■:' ■ ' ■', ' ■ ■ '' ■ ■■ ■ ■■ ' ''>!. /:.■'■:-3P'.'5-; 4.5% 
■HospitaT Carei- .,: ■ . ■ ■ ■■ 286:.T^ 38.4% 31.1 
Physician Expenclituires 150 .9 23.1 
$ Each 
Medicaid Enrollmeiit 1990 <thousands> 25,255 3,:524­
Medidaid PaYmehts 1990 <iDillions> $66. 0 $2^5 
Medicaid 1990 Total Hospital Discharges 3, 932 
<1,000> '■ ■ ' '; 
Medicaid 1990 Recipients Discharged <1,000> 2, 758 
Total Days of Care 22,059 
Medicaid Admissions per 1,000 covered 155.69 
Average Length of Stay (ALOS) 5.6 
All Hospitals 1990 Admissions per 1,000 : 131. 0 
All Hospitals 1990 Average Length of Stay 7.2 
All Hospitals 1990 Outpatient Visits per 1,265.0 
1,000 ■ , ■ ■ :./ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■'■"■'■;. ' 
Table 3 Selected Discharge Data 
1991 
Total Discharges per 1,000 113 .6 
Discharges per 1,000 Males 101.3 
Discharges per 1,000 Females 126.5 
Discharges per 1,000 under 15 45 .3 
years of age 
Discharges per 1,000 15-44 99.3 
Discharges per 1,000 45-64 132 .2 
Discharges per 1,000 65 & over 340 .3 
ALOS Total : 6.3 
ALOS Males 6 . 9 
ALOS Females 5.8 
ALOS Under 15 years of age ' ■ ■ : 4.8 
ALOS 15-44 ^ 4.7 
ALOS 45-64 i . 6.5 
ALOS 65 & over 8.6 
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Tables 3 and 4 show mortality rates by age categories
 
and gender in 1991 for the U.S. Figures 17 and 18 show
 
California census data by demographic chafactexistics.
 
Table 4 Mortality Data
 
Age Deaths per 100,000
 
Under 1 916.6
 
1-4 47.4
 
5-14 23.6
 
15-24 100.1
 
25-34 139.1
 
35-44 224.4
 
45-54 468.8
 
55-64 1,181.0
 
65-74 2,618.5
 
75-84 5,890.0
 
85 & Ove 15,107.6
 
Research Approach ';
 
In this research, preventable readmissions and deaths
 
were used as indicators for measuring the quality of care.
 
Specifically, the variations in rates between Medi-Cal and
 
HMO cases from the OSHPD California Hospital Discharge
 
Dataset were compared to test the hypothesis that Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries did not experience higher risks of ^
 
readmissions and deaths when enrolled in HMOs.
 
A large data set had been abstracted from the
 
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
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Development Hospital Discharge Data to measure the
 
preventable readmiss,ion rates among California hospitalized
 
pa.tients in 1991. Similar to mortality, preventable
 
readmission to a hospital shortly following discharge is a
 
discernible event with a connection to the quality of care.
 
Prospective payment systems, based on diagnosis related
 
groups or risk capitated payments, theoretically provide
 
ihcentives for the early discharge of beneficiaries. Early
 
discharges may increase the risk of ensuing preventable
 
readmission if all hecessary medical care is not completed
 
appropriately during a patient's fifSt hospital stay.
 
Although Clear linkages between preventable
 
readmissions and poor quality of care during the ensuing
 
hospital stay have been established, continued research to
 
measure preveritable readmissions should continue.
 
Moreover, the current political resolve to achieve
 
MediCaid cost savings from greater HMO enrollment will
 
likely raise the specter and scrutiny of partisan
 
politicians, employers, beneficiaries, and managed care
 
opponents.
 
This research explores the results of Medi-Cal non-HMO
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beneficiaries and HMO beneficiaries. The Medi-Cal
 
beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs may also be included in the
 
HMO; which, is acceptable because the effects of plan
 
selection and respective risks (HMO or Medi-Cal FFS) are the
 
ultimate goals of this research.
 
Hypothesis
 
I hypothesize that preventable readmissions and
 
mortality rates of the 1991 hospitalized Medicaid cases were
 
not higher than the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)
 
beneficiary cases.
 
CHAPTER TWO - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
 
Quality of Care
 
Defining quality of care has become a major concern of
 
employers, consumers, payers, and health care professionals.
 
There are varying degrees of quality, numerous methods to
 
measure quality, and many influences on quality. According
 
to Avedis Donabedian, in simple terms, quality care is the
 
balance between health benefits and harm (Donabedian 1982).
 
Furthermore, Donabedian contends that assessment of quality
 
is a judgment concerning the processes of care, based on the
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extent or degree to which the care contributes to valued
 
butcomes. The attributes that comprise quality ar
 
clear. Judgments are often made about the persons providing
 
care and the settings where the care was provided. The
 
management of.an episode of care is perhaps the most common
 
and easiest module of care that is studied.
 
An episode of care identifies many elements that can be
 
used to assess the quality bf cafe (Donabe^ian, 1982) '
 
A primary tenet of Donabedian's definition was that
 
management of patient care can be divided into two domains:
 
technical and interpersonal. The technical domain is
 
comprised of the science of care methods and technology. The
 
interpersonal domain pertains to the social and
 
psychological interactions between the patient and provider.
 
The two domains are closely related and may influence one
 
another. Amenities such as room comforts, good food,
 
pleasant surroundings, and similar comforts can be
 
considered as part of the interpersonal domain. They are
 
considered to belong in the interpersonal domain because
 
they are perceived to be linked with the provider of care.
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 The quantity of care must also be considered when
 
making a judgment about quality. If amounts of care are
 
insufficient to realize an intended benefit, then the
 
quality of care is poor. Conversely, excessive unnecessary
 
quantities of care could be considered poor qua.lity as well.
 
If unnecessary care is given, itissed pppbrtunities to use
 
resources that could have benefited others in nped may
 
occur. ■' ; .'V'. 
f i The failure of a system to provide an appropriate ^ 
quantity of care may suggest ihadequacies in the system for 
providing care, poor judgment, carelessness, or ignorance. 
The monetary costs of care also perform an important 
part in the quality of care. There is a direct relationship 
between quantity of care and monetary costs. Donabedian 
contends that care is costlier if excessive or inefficient. 
The inefficient care may be a result of unbalanced staffing, 
inappropriate work duties, and unbalanced occupancy rates. 
The monetary costs used to determine the quality of 
care may be used if the costs are added to risk as an 
unwanted outcome of the care provided. 
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There are many specific elements in providing the care
 
which influence benefits and risks: patient condition, co-

morbidities, medical technology, staff competency,
 
contractual restrictions, intensity of workload, and many
 
more. The ultimate goal of providing quality care is to
 
achieve the peak benefits after the deduction of risks and
 
costs.
 
Also, it 1s important to mention that providers may
 
vary about their perceived benefits, risks, and costs
 
(Donabedian, 1991).: , /
 
In the managed care environment of today, costs may be
 
a factor that has become too influential. As revenues
 
decrease, the costs have become a covariant and must also
 
decrease. ;
 
The application of judgments and measures of quality
 
must correspond to the purview of the care given and
 
relevancy. Thus, it may be necessary to evaluate the
 
structure, process, and outcome for a defined beneficiary,
 
group, or population.
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Assessment Approaches
 
Donabedian developed an approach for quality assessment
 
and program evaluation with three fundamental relations:
 
structure, process, and outcome.
 
The structure component is characterized as the
 
provider stability, tools and resources, physical
 
organization and settings, and health insurance. The process
 
element is the set of activities within and between patients
 
and providers.
 
The outcome's portion of the model is the change in a
 
patient's health status that is attributed to the health
 
care provided.
 
The idea of structure includes financial resources,
 
human resources, and physical settings. It includes the
 
quality and quantity of the personnel, equipment available,
 
health care facility geographic distribution and quantities,
 
finance and delivery of service organization, and the
 
presence of health insurance. Structure is related to
 
quality in that it may increase or decrease the probability
 
of good performance. A good structure for care should
 
include a mechanism for monitoring the quality of care.
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The process element of the model assesses tlie
 
relationship between the characteristics of the medical care
 
processes and their consequences to the health and welfare
 
of individuals and society, in congruence with the values ^ 
 
the individual and society.
 
Also, the technical characteristics of the prpcess^^^^^
 
care and the resulting consequences may be revealed by :
 
examining congruencerwith norms of care, appropriateness>
 
and technological advancement.
 
The process of care is therefore normative behavior.
 
The norms are derived from science, society, and ethics. The
 
assessment of processes of care may be observational or by
 
review of records.
 
Finally, the outcome component of the model attempts to
 
measure the change in health status as a result of medical
 
care. It includes patient knowledge, attitude, and
 
behaviors. The assertion includes social, psychological, and
 
social function aspects of performance. Also, patient
 
satisfaction is included as a component of outcome. Outcome
 
measurements provide indirect proxies of health objective
 
attainment. Donabedian contends that outcomes are clearly
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the best method of evaluating the quality of care provided;
 
To serve as the measure of quality, other causes for changes
 
in health status must be eliminated.
 
Thus, structure, process/ and outcomes are approaches
 
to the acquisition of information about the identification
 
of attributes that define and effect quality care. In this
 
research, I have chosen outcomes as the approach to
 
assessing the quality of care.
 
The theoretical framework for evaluating quality,
 
outcomes, and monitoring was based on Donabedian'S models.
 
The methods and findings from Donabedian's research lend a
 
paradigm for evaluating outcomes as a measure of quality
 
health care.
 
Although little empirical evidence exists to show that
 
the quality of care is significantly diminishing as a result
 
of increased managed care enrollment, it is important that
 
quality must not be weakened or diminished. There are
 
several organizations with indirect authority that are
 
chartered to monitor the quality of care. Two of these
 
organizations are JCAHO and NCQA.
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states like Galifbrhia wMch licence HMOs '
 
conduct random audits to ensure compliance with strict ru
 
and regulations.
 
At this time, no clear and effective method of
 
measuring the quality of care exists; instead, proxy or
 
quasi methods of evaluating outcomes are used. These
 
measures include patient satisfactioh surveys, targeted ::
 
prevention methods--breast cancer screenings per 1,000,
 
immunization compliance, recidivism, lengths of stay, admits
 
per 1,000, days per 1,000, cost per procedures, employee
 
absenteeism, employee turnover, substance abuse rates,
 
mortality rates, low birth weights, and many more. Moreover,
 
explicit clinical guidelines are under development in the
 
private and government segments that will be used to
 
evaluate modalities, treatment efficacy, and refined care
 
pathways.
 
The shift from input to outcome's management provides
 
health care professionals, payers, society, employers, and
 
patients with the tools and measures to allocate scarce
 
resources where the greatest benefit will be realized. The
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outcome measurements provide patient and system level data
 
that can be measured and applied. ;
 
It would be imprudent to attempt structural :and process
 
level assessments as th^ priraary objective due to the ;
 
enormously complex systems that exist.
 
Preventable Readmission Literature
 
Discharge Education and Readmissions ,
 
The case management process addresses the issues of
 
resource allocation, effectiveness of care, cost
 
containment, and accountability--all important elements in
 
an effective utilization program.
 
It is important that case management of the patient,
 
including discharge planning and discharge education, begin
 
at admission, to prepare the patient for self-care at home,
 
for every patient in the hospital faces discharge. Recovery
 
from illness may be improved, the transition to home can be
 
eased, utilization of home health care may be decreased, and
 
unplanned preventable readmission may be decreased when the
 
nurse provides supportive-educative guidance and teaches the
 
patient self-care while in the hospital (Harmon, 1993).
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Patients who have been instructed prior to discharge in 
the care that is ^ to ;be continued at home> ■ including 
medications to be taken> had fewer preventable readmissions. 
When the patient receives no education or inadequate 
education in the hospital, preventable readmission to the 
hospital may occur, resulting in unnecessary utilization of 
limited resources (Harmon, 1993). 
A descriptive study of preventable readmissions
 
relating to education as a part of the discharge plan was
 
conducted in a large urban acute facility. The medical
 
record was used to answer the question of whether or not a
 
need for discharge education was identified, and if a need
 
was identified, was discharge education provided.
 
If discharge education was or was not provided, did an
 
unplanned preventable readmission occur for that reason.
 
The theoretical framework for this study of the
 
relationship between patient discharge education and
 
unplanned hospital preventable readmission was based on
 
Orem's Self-Care Model. According to this research,
 
appropriate discharge education, which teaches the patient
 
self-reliance and self-management, could decrease health
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 care costs associated with unplanned preventable
 
readmission.
 
A s knowledge of activities that ne^*^^^^ 
performed to maintain health and recover from health 
deviations and the knowledge of the skills needed to perform 
the actions that knowledge provides are essential to 
preventing unplanned hospital preventable readmission 
(Harmon, 1993). . „ ■ 
A supportive nursing system provided the framework for
 
goal oriented action to meet universal self-care requisites
 
during discharge planning of ambulatory patients. The care
 
plan progressed from wholly compensatory to educative
 
deve1opmenta1 care directed toward family education. Nurses
 
have professional and legal responsibilities in performing
 
nursing care and preparing the patient for self-care.
 
Case management and discharge planning are the
 
processes whereby the patient's needs are identified for
 
care after hospitalization and coordination of needed
 
education.
 
Discharge planning provides for continuity to the home
 
setting of the care that was provided in the hospital
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XHarmon,, 1993). The dischar< e planning function focuses on
 
f
 
the restoration of the patient and must involve the
 
participation of the patient, family, and friends to be
 
successful.
 
The process incorporates the assessment of the
 
patient's needs, the plan of actions to prepare the patient
 
for discharge, the discharge implementation plan, and the
 
evaluation of the plan outcomes.
 
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health
 
Organizations (JCAHO) Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
 
(1989), which monitors the quality of care provided to
 
patients by hospitals, requires in the Medical Record
 
Services Standard that medical records are documented in an
 
accurate and timely manner, including any specific
 
instructions given to the patient and/or family. The JCAHO
 
Standard also requires that advisement is given relating to
 
physical activity, medication, diet, follow-up care, and
 
that the medical record indicates when preprinted
 
instructions are given to the patient.
 
The JCAHO Nursing Services Standard requires that
 
patient education and nursing documentation is relative and
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dondise, and those patients who are discliarged from tlie
 
hospital requiring nursing dare also receive instructions
 
and ,cduhse!ling prior to discharge -(Harmon; 1993).
 
Identified Education Need for Self-Care
 
Education need was defined as any need for discharge
 
education, teaching, or instruction in self-care identified
 
by a professional, the patient, or the researcher.
 
Twenty-one (95%) of the readmitted group were
 
identified as needing education by the following
 
professionals: nurse, physician, rehabilitation therapist,
 
medical social worker, dietitian, and dentist. Considered
 
were the pharmacist, speech pathologist, and the protocol
 
R.N.; however, these professional did not identify a need
 
for teaching self-care. In addition, the patient identified
 
an education need and the researcher identified discharge
 
education needs for self-care that were not otherwise
 
identified (Harmon, 1993).
 
For the 21 readmitted subjects, 95% (n=21) had 45
 
education's needs identified in nine categories: (1)
 
physical activity; (2) activities of daily living and/or
 
instrumental activities of daily living ; (3) diet; (4)
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medication; (5) procedures; (6) community resources; (7)
 
emotional support, (8) symptom control; and (9) durable
 
medical equipment and/on oxygen. Thirteen (65%) of the not
 
readmitted gjroup were identified as needing education by the
 
professionals and had 24 identified education needs in sever
 
of the nine categories. No education needs were identified
 
for community resources or emotional support in the non-

readmitted group. Four subjects (20%) in the not readmitted
 
group had no identified need for self-care education and 3
 
(15%) were not applicable (expired).
 
There was no significant statistical difference between
 
the two groups in the education need identified (x2=13.9,
 
df=8, p=0.08). When education need was scored by category
 
for the two groups with each need receiving a score of one,
 
no significant statistical difference was observed (x2=9.9,
 
df=6, p=0.1; t=2.5, df=40, p=0.1).
 
An education need was identified by nursing staff in
 
24.5% of the readmitted group, which included Staff RNs
 
Staff LVNs, Discharge Planners, and a student nurse.
 
In the non-readmitted group, education was identified
 
by nursing staff for 35% of the subjects.
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Education Provided for Self-Gare
 
Twenty (95.2%) subjects in the readmitted group were
 
identified as the person to be taught, and/or nine (42.9%)
 
significant others. In the not readmitted group, 11 (64.7%)
 
of the patients were to be taught and/or six (35.3%)
 
significant otheis.
 
Readiness of the patient to learn was determinable in
 
all cases. Typical descriptors given for readiness to learn
 
were: motivated, willing, understanding, cooperative, or
 
receptive. For not ready to learn, descriptors were anxiety,
 
unwilling, cognition deficit, mentally not ready to accept
 
disease status, and unstable emotional status. Some subjects
 
had more than one descriptor.
 
Indicators considered but not present were: eager,
 
pain, hesitant, language, depressed, functional disability,
 
and low comprehension (Harmon, 1993).
 
There were 22 cancer patients readmitted to the
 
hospital in the study. All of the subjects were readmitted
 
to the hospital within 15 days of discharge from an acute
 
care facility.
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Ages ranged from 14 to 70 years, with a median age of
 
57.5 (Mean 53.6, SD 19.05). Of the nine males (41%) and 13
 
females (59%), 50% (n 11) were single, widowed, or divorced.
 
English was the language of 82% (n 18). 4% (n 1) spoke
 
Spanish; lahguage was not available for 14%.
 
The control g'roup consisted of a convenience sample of
 
20 subjects randomly matched with the readmitted subjects on
 
the date of discharge from the initial admission. The
 
control group was not readmitted within 15 days. Ages ranged
 
24 to 80 years, with a median age of 53.5.
 
Seven males (35%) and 13 females (65%) were in the
 
control group, of whom 60% were married, and 40% were
 
single, widowed, or divorced. 90% of the control group were
 
English speaking, 5% were Spanish speaking, and for 5%,
 
language was not available. Educational level was not
 
available for the control group.
 
There was no significant statistical difference between
 
the readmitted and the not readmitted groups in age, gender,
 
martial status, or lahguage (Harmon, 1993).
 
Many occupations were represented, ranging from clerk
 
to executive. No analysis of difference in occupations was
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performed. Educational level was not easily retrievable,
 
therefore it was not analyzed.
 
Hospital Preventable Readmission
 
To determine the relationship of caregiver's knowledge
 
of home care to preventable readmission of high-risk infants
 
and toddlers, Kun and Warburton (1987) conducted telephone
 
interviews 48 hours after discharge from the hospital using
 
questionnaires based on the actual practice of home care
 
nurse specialists who had assisted physicians in
 
establishing guidelines for each specific treatment.
 
Questions were categorized into three areas: (1) basic
 
knowledge of treatment; (2) knowledge of operation and
 
maintenance of equipment and supplies; and (3) information
 
about vendors.
 
Sixty high-risk infants and toddlers at Children's
 
Hospital of Los Angeles were discharged with written home-

treatment instructions from the intermediate care infant and
 
toddler units between October 1, 1985, and February 28,
 
198£.
 
The intermediate care unit had nurse-to-patient ratio
 
of 1:3. Subsequent preventable readmissions were monitored
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and studied for six months following the initial discharge.
 
Non-parametric statistics were used to describe telephone
 
assessment of knowledge base and hospital preventable
 
readmission data.
 
Parents of patients with single treatments scored
 
higher in their knowledge base than pairents of patients with
 
multiple home care treatments; caregivers of patients
 
readmitted scored well. This study concludes that none of
 
the preventable readmissions were due to a failure of home
 
care management for patients with single treatments without
 
showing causal link. It does not give the method of
 
measuring preventable readmissions nor does it address the
 
cost of preventable readmission. Missing also is information
 
on patient education during the hospitalization.
 
Elderly patients who received medication instructions
 
from the nurse as a part of the discharge planning process
 
was less likely to be readmitted to the hospital (Markley
 
and Igou, 1987). This study indicates that the educational
 
process should be an integral and expected part of the
 
patient's daily activities over the period of
 
hospitalization.
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A study of 2,238 medical records randomly selected from
 
42,880 discharges in six contrasting hospital populations
 
found that 13% of the patients accounted for as much of the
 
hospital charges as the other 87%, and that cancer was
 
included in six of 19 major diagnostic categories
 
representing two-thirds of the most costly 20% of patients
 
(Zook, Savickis, and Moore 1980).
 
Among these high cost patients were those with repeated
 
hospitalizations within one year for the same disease.
 
Another study found that repeated hospitalizations for
 
the same disease accounted for 60 percent of all
 
hospitalizations were more expensive than the first
 
hospitalization, with cancer one of the three exceptions
 
with no statistical difference.
 
Patients with particular illnesses or traits that lead
 
to repeated hospitalization could benefit from vigorous
 
follow-up to increase medical compliance. In addition,
 
health insurance financial incentives should be structured
 
to encouraged preventive programs and low-cost alternatives
 
and to discourage costly hospital preventable readmissions.
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Ten variables were identified through regression
 
analysis that were statistically significant predictors of
 
preventable readmissions within 60 days of discharge for the
 
Medicare population (Anderson and Steinberg, 1985). Patient
 
education was not addressed in the 20 variables studied.
 
Patients with a discharge diagnosis of cancer, as well
 
as those with AIDS and renal disease, were associated with
 
increased risks of emergency preventable readmission within
 
90 days of discharge (Phillips, Safran, Cleary, and Delbanco
 
1987).
 
Twelve diagnostic categories associated with
 
preventable readmission and suspected laboratory or
 
demographic variables were tested.
 
Patient education as a variable was not tested.
 
Decision analysis was used as a framework to examine the
 
interrelation of cost and efficacy for interventions
 
designed to reduce emergency preventable readmission to an
 
acute care hospital (Safran and Phillips, 1989). Patient
 
education as a specific cost and benefit were not examined,
 
but rather was included in a list of services that
 
hospitalized patients receiye.
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Forty medical records were examined using non-disease­
specific discharge criteria for adequacy of medical care for
 
patients readmitted within 90 days (Ashton, et al., 1987). A
 
significant degree of predictive validity was found.
 
The Rand Corporation, however, with the Department of
 
HHS> did compare outcotries of the prepaid care to fee-for­
service, including a small Medicaid enrollment, in a 1986
 
study of participants in the Group Health Cooperative (GHC)
 
of Puget Sound, Seattle. The study concludes that for most
 
people, and particularly for those with high incomes, GHC
 
care saved money and may have been better for health
 
outcomes.
 
For the limited group of Medicaid enrollees that the
 
Study covered, health outcomes appeared poorer than for
 
those in fee-for-service.
 
GHC officials acknowledged that the system would need
 
modification and supplementation for the poor (Ware, 1987).
 
The most comprehensive comparative Study that
 
considered outcomes for Medicaid/AFDC HMOs has been
 
conducted by the Research Triangle Institute for the Health
 
Care Financing Administration (1988). In this research
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project, a quality of care study was completed in 1985 for
 
populations in mandatory Medicaid HMO demonstration projects
 
in Santa Barbara County, OA and Jackson County, MO. These
 
were compared to fee-for-Service Medicaid populations in
 
adjacent communities. The pioject took a random sample of
 
2,400 women on AFDC between 15 and 45 and their children
 
under 4 years old. Over 2300 births were abstracted from the
 
four projects, as well as other selected information such as
 
maternal health status and outpatient services. Medical
 
records were abstracted for this sample, and questionnaires
 
given to doctors and clients.
 
The overall conclusion of the study was that the HMO
 
management of care showed no significant effect on self-

assessed health status, health habits, or use of preventive
 
services.
 
In particular, ho significant effect was found in mean
 
birth Weightvor the low birth weight rate, in the C-section
 
rate, or in the complications of delivery.
 
The study found, however, that care in all the sites
 
was "inadequate" and that these problems were "generic to
 
the population served and to Medicaid programs regardless of
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the existence of capitation or case management!' (Executive
 
Summary, Research Triangle, p. 3, 1988). .
 
According' to a.;1991 study at the Harvard SchCoL of
 
Public Health, 150,000 persons die each year in hospitals
 
due to negligent care; this figure is six times greater than
 
from street crime. Moreover, a study conducted at Rand by
 
Dr. Robert Brook, concluded that one-third of all
 
hospitalization care is inappropriate. These data clearly
 
depict the costs associated with inappropriate health care.
 
CHAPTER THREE -- METHODOLOGY
 
Design and Methods
 
To determine whether Medi-Cal and HMO readmissions
 
within 30 days of discharge and deaths were potentially
 
preventable, I retrospectively studied hospital readmissions
 
and mortality rates of 50% of all California
 
hospitalizations in 1991 (169,397 cases). The 50% sample of
 
all hospital discharges was coded into three primary payer
 
categories: Medi-Cal, HMO, and others. The payer categories
 
were then compared with one another and the aggregate to
 
determine the odds ratio of their respective rates.
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The design method employed was an observational
 
retrospective cohort study. I controlled for confounding by
 
matching payer categories. I abstracted data sets from the
 
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
 
Development Hospital Discharge Data using random probability
 
sampling for the patient samples. The sample size was 50% of
 
the 1991 hospitalized patients greater than 1 year in age.
 
The dependent variables in this study were patient
 
preventable readmission (nominal) and mortality (nominal).
 
The independent variable was the patient payer type
 
(nominal). Cases were dichotomized between death and non-

death and preventable readmission or non-preventable
 
readmission.
 
Reliability and Validity
 
The validity of using outcome mea,sures to assess the
 
quality of health care is quite justifiable. First, outcomes
 
present precise and measurable depictions of the end result
 
of care. Second, the inferences drawn from the data are
 
justifiable. The outcome's data are less receptive to
 
misinterpretation as a result of insufficient data.
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Overall, outcomes are inherently valid because they are
 
unquestionable about whether they are favorable or
 
unfavorable. In other words, one would prefer life to death,
 
functional ability to inability, and comfort from pain. The
 
use of processes to assess quality of care requires greater
 
validity because of the enormous variability in
 
appropriateness of methods and technologies.
 
It is however important to note that not all outcomes
 
are clearly defined as favorable or desired.
 
An example may be cholesterol levels, blood sugar
 
levels, and other clinical outcome measures that are not
 
absolutely defined. For this reason, the readmission and
 
mortality measures were selected because of their discrete
 
measurement.
 
More importantly, for the purpose of practical
 
research, it is extremely difficult to account for all of
 
the possible processes that take place during the provision
 
of care. Moreover, the cost of this approach would be
 
prohibitive.
 
By using outcomes as the tool for measuring the quality
 
of care, scientific methods, technology, and processes of
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care can change while the desired outcome measures remain
 
the..,;sarae ■ ■ 
In other words, if the desired outcome is to reduce
 
episodes of cesarean sections from 6.3 per thousand in 1991,
 
to 4.0 in 1999, the means of achieving the results are not
 
measured. I do not wish to suggest that the means or methods
 
are unimportant.
 
Most importantly, valid causality is derived neither
 
from process nor outcomes. In this respect, both segments
 
are integrated. When both process and outcomes are used to
 
establish causality, inferences can be made with confidence.
 
It is more practical and cost effective to measure
 
baseline outcomes with actual outcomes and then pursue an
 
in-depth review of the process antecedents of care. If an
 
outcome measure varies significantly from values that are
 
considered appropriate or normative, then a researcher or
 
organization may evaluate the associated processes in
 
■detail''i- ^ 
The use of process evaluation as a quality measurement 
tool is more rigid, absolute, and costly because of the 
breadth of required elements that would require measurement. 
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It is my contention that by developing standards of
 
outcome measures at the highest point achievable, the
 
processes and systems are encouraged and stimulated into
 
pursuing the most efficient and innovative method for
 
achieving the desired end results.
 
The use of payer source as the independent variable to
 
measure the outcomes of death and readmission was integral
 
.to this research.
 
The sample size of the random sample of cases should
 
allow for valid generalizations about the differences in
 
outcomes between Medi-Gal and HMO payer health plan types
 
The similarity between the demographic composition, the
 
primary diagnoses, and population size lends confidence in
 
the statistical measures and conclusions from this research.
 
In addition, the duration in years in which California
 
hospitals have been providing these data and the State's
 
rigorousness for verification and validation;further lends .
 
to the credibility of the sample cases and respective
 
outcomes of this research.
 
Internal validity was not subject to selection bias,
 
placebo effect, or instrument selection biases associated
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with other research methods. The use of an observational
 
retrospective cohort study allows unbiased selection of
 
outcomes.
 
The selection of the research cases was random,
 
relevant to the study and situation, were validated by a
 
reliable government agency, controlled for confounding, not
 
subject to researcher bias, were not subject to investigator
 
interactions, and were large enough to generalize about the
 
populations.
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First Hypothesis
 
One Dependent Variable
 
READMISSION
 
(Nominal)
 
One Independent Variable
 
PAYER-HMO & MEDI-CAL
 
(Nominal)
 
Null Hypothesis
 
There is nota Statistically Significant Greater Ratio
 
in Readmissions of Medi-Cal Payer Hospitaiizations Than
 
Health Maintenance Organization Payer Hospitaiizations
 
Alternate Hypothesis
 
There is a Statisticaiiy Significant Greater Ratio
 
in Readmissions ofMedi-CaiPayerHospitaiizations Than
 
Health Maintenance Organization Payer Hospitaiizations
 
Point Estimate: Means Testing
 
Readmissions:
 
Medi-Cai-HMO
 
Student's t test
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Second Hypothesis
 
One bependentVariably
 
MORTALITY
 
'-\([Nomirial) :
 
One Independent Variable
 
PAYER-HMO & MEDI-CAL
 
(Nominal)
 
NullHypothesis
 
Th^e is nota Statistically SignificahtGreater Ratio
 
in
 
Alternate Hypothesis
 
There is a Statistioaily Significant Greater Ratio
 
ofDeathsin Medi-CalPayerHospitaiizations Than
 
in'
 
Point Estimate: Means Testing
 
Deaths:
 
Medi-Cai-HMO
 
Odds Ratios
 
Other variables included were gender (nominal), race
 
(nominal), age category (ordinal), disposition (nominal),
 
DRG (nominal), number of diagnoses (ratio), length of stay
 
(ration), and number of admissions (ratio).
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CHAPTER FOUR -- RESULTS
 
Data Analysis
 
Data were analyzed using the SPSSS PC stp-tistical
 
software program for statistical analysis. Descriptive
 
statistics were used to compare the two groups of patients:
 
those patients readmitted and those patients not readmitted,
 
and those patients who died and patients who survived.
 
Frequencies, means, and odds ratio analyses were used to
 
describe the data. Odds Ratio analysis was used to compare
 
nominal level data for the two groups.
 
There were 40 variables and 169,367 cases in the data
 
set analyzed. The age variable contains the patient age in
 
years. The payment source variable contains the expected
 
source of payment at the time of discharge and included the
 
two independent variables of Medi-Cal and HMO. The principal
 
diagnosis variable contained the codes assigned to the case
 
upon discharge. Also included was the second through fourth
 
diagnoses assigned to the case; however, I chose to analyze
 
only the primary diagnosis. / ;
 
The race variable contained seven data categories and
 
was evaluated for correlation and confounding.
 
In the Appendix, the data variables are shown with
 
their scales and brief descriptions.
 
Sex was another variable contained in the data set that
 
was analyzed for its effects on preventable readmission and
 
mortality. The record number was also crucial for this
 
research. It contained the encrypted proxy of the members
 
social security number. This variable allowed measurement
 
of individuals as they were discharged from hospitals
 
throughout California.
 
The admission source included nine types of patient
 
admission. This variable was analyzed to determine whether
 
relationships existed between payer, preventable
 
readmissions, and mortality. This variable essentially
 
depicts the place (ER, SNF, etc.) from which the patient
 
entered into care. There was also a variable that shows the
 
type or way in which the patient entered care (urgent,
 
scheduled, emergent, etc.); it is the Admission Type
 
variable.
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The length of stay (LOS) variable was used throughout
 
the analysis. It contains the number of'in-hospital da:ys,\t^^^^
 
patient experienced. The admit date code was important for
 
determining whether a patient had been readmitted (dependent
 
The disposition variable was important because it
 
contained the mortality dependent variable among other
 
possible discharge categories.
 
The admission major diagnostic category (MDC), and
 
report source variables were not used in this research. The
 
diagnosis, procedure, and admission variables were analyzed
 
for relationships and severity of illness. The
 
medical/surgical variable represents the service provided to
 
the patient. The medical/surgical variable was compared with
 
the payer types (independent variable) and the preventable
 
readmission and mortality variables (dependents).
 
The multiple admissions variable is a derived variable
 
from the patient number and admission dates. It is
 
dichotomized to 0 meaning no preventable readmissions, and 1
 
for preventable readmissions present for this beneficiary.
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The admits in month variable is also caloulated to
 
depict the number of admissions in the month the patient
 
experienced.
 
The age category's variable is calculated to classify
 
the beneficiary into a defined age range for more useful
 
analyses The mortality and payer variables were also
 
dichotomized for the purpose of analyses. The mortality^i
 
variable had an assigned value of 0 for non-death outcomes
 
and 1 for death,
 
The payer variable assigned 0 for Medi-Cal and 1 for
 
HMO beneficiary types. The data yariable formats and
 
descriptions are detailed in t^^ Appendix.
 
Descriptive Results
 
There were 36,964 preventable readmissions (22% of
 
study cases), from 15,736 patients during the study period.
 
Of the 36,964 preventable readmissions, 15,733 (43%) were
 
Male and 21,231 (57%) were Female. These gender percentages
 
were comparable to the non-preventable readmission
 
populations. The age group between 50 and 74 had the
 
greatest number of admissions (40%) and preventable
 
readmissions (40.3%).
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Of the 36,964 preventable readmission cases studied,
 
978 (3%) died. Routine discharges accounted for 26,381 (71%)
 
of the overall discharges.
 
Of the non-preventable readmission cases, 3.9% (1,635)
 
of the male discharges resulted in death, while 1.7% (1,577)
 
of the female discharges resulted in deaths.
 
Of the 3,212 non-preventable readmission deaths, 2,391
 
(74.4%) were white, 352 (11.0%) were black, 299 (9.3%) were
 
Hispanic, and the remaining 170 (5.3%) were other races. Of
 
the 3,212 non-preventable readmission deaths, 2,068 (64.4%)
 
entered care through the emergency room, 776 (24.2%) entered
 
through routine, 177 (5.5%) through skilled nursing, and the
 
remaining cases through other sources. One percent of
 
Routine admission sources resulted in deaths, while 4.4% of
 
the emergent cases resulted in deaths. The preventable
 
readmission cases depicted no statistically significant
 
differences when comparing non-preventable readmissions by
 
race, gender, source of admission, type of admission, DRG,
 
length of stay, and payer type.
 
Table 9 presents the data abstraction and analysis. In
 
this table, Medi-Cal and HMO sample cases are divided by
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total, episodes and preventable readmissiori episodes,
 
©pmparisons have been made to show the differences between
 
the Medi-Cal and HMO preventable readmissions cases by-

demographic characteristic, case modes, disposition, and
 
admission type.
 
The data show minor differences in the overall
 
percentage of preventable readmissions between Medi-Cal (20%
 
readmitted) and HMO (20% readmitted) cases.
 
There was a difference between genders; male Medi-Cal
 
payer beneficiaries experienced a 34% preventable
 
readmission rate while HMO payer beneficiaries experienced a
 
24% preventable readmission rate. The female Medi-Cal payer
 
beneficiaries experienced 15% preventable readmission rate
 
while the HMO payer beneficiaries experience a 14%
 
preventable readmission rate.
 
The significantly dissimilar age categories were
 
between 41 and 65 years of age. In these age categories,
 
Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries experienced 11-14 percent
 
higher preventable readmission rates than HMO payer
 
beneficiaries did. The other age categories were comparable.
 
The mean overall age of the Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries was
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32, while the mean age of the HMO payer beneficiaries was
 
41. The mean age of the Medi-Cal preventable readmission
 
population was 38, while the mean age of the HMO readmitted
 
population was 47. in both categories, the HMO population
 
was older. Race did not depict any significant differences
 
among overall and readmitted HMO and Medi-Cal populations.
 
Table 9 also includes the top 5 DRGs from the payer
 
populations, 7 categories of disposition, 5 categories of
 
admission type, and mean utilization figures. The top DRGs
 
show no significant differences among overall, readmitted,
 
HMO, and Medi-Cal cases.
 
The only two disposition categories with significantly
 
different preventable readmission rates were for Other
 
facility and Structured Nursing Facility (SNF) discharges.
 
The Medi-Cal preventable readmission discharges to
 
Other Facilities were l7.5% greater than the HMO preventable
 
readmission discharges, while the Medi-Cal preventable
 
readmission discharges to SNF were 11.5% greater than the
 
HMO preventable readmission discharges.
 
The type of admission category having the greatest
 
difference between Medi-Cal and HMO preventable readmissions
 
94
 
was the Elective category. Medi-Cal Elective preventable
 
readmissions were 16% higher than HMQ Elective preventable
 
readmissions.
 
The mean number of diagnoses, mean number of
 
procedures, itiean number of admissions, and mean lengths of
 
stays were similar between the overall Medi-Cal and HMO
 
cases. However, the Medi-Cal readmission cases revealed mean
 
number of admits and mean lengths of stay that were greater
 
than the HMO mean data. In addition, the mean number of
 
diagnoses, mean number of admissions, and mean length of
 
stays were significantly higher for the preventable ;
 
readmission cases of both Medi-Cal and HMO payer • ; ;
 
beneficiaries compared to the overall cases. (The overall
 
cases are both non-readmitted and readmitted cases.)
 
Top Five Counties
 
Table 5 Top 5 Counties by Admissions
 
COUNTY # OF CASES % OF CASES 
Alameda 40,513 23.9 
Contra Costa 25,910 :;f:lH;.:3 
Los Angeles 23,719 14.0 
Fresno 22,667 13.4 
Kern 18,757 11.1 
77.6 
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Table 6 Top 5 Counties by Preventable Readtnissions
 
COUNTY
 
Alameda
 
Contra Costa
 
Fresno
 
Los Angeles
 
Kern i
 
# OF CASES
 
10,471
 
6,381
 
4,603
 
4,294
 
4,020
 
% OF CASES
 
28.3
 
17.3
 
12.5
 
11.6
 
10.9
 
80.6
 
Table 7 Top 5 Counties by HMO Cases
 
COUNTY # OF CASES % OF CASES 
Alameda 10,093 35.7 
Contra Costa 25.7 
Los Angeles 12.8 
Fresno 2,862 10.1 
Kern 1,312 -4.6 
88.9 
Table 8 Top 5 Counties by Medi-Cal Cases
 
COUNTY
 
Alameda
 
Fresno
 
Los Angeles
 
Kern
 
Contra Costa
 
# OF CASES % OF CASES
 
7,426 19.9
 
6,979 18.7
 
6,700 17.9
 
4,362 11.7
 
3,303 8.8
 
77.0
 
Table 9 Top 5 Counties by All Payers
 
COUNTY
 
Alameda
 
Contra Costa
 
Los Angeles
 
Kern
 
Fresno
 
# OF CASES
 
22,994
 
,,lS:'/;3;94;^;
 
13,083
 
12,826
 
% OF CASES
 
22.2
 
14.8
 
12.9
 
12.6
 
12.4
 
74.9
 
Tables 4 through 8 reveal the top readmission and
 
overall cases by payer source and county» These tables
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reveal that Alameda County has the highest number of
 
admissions by HMO, Medi-Cal and all-phyer sources. In
 
addition, Alameda. had the highest readmission rate of 28.3%
 
of all cases; although, Alameda represented only 23.9% of
 
the overall cases. These data show a disproportionate number
 
of readmissions in Alameda County when compared to the other
 
payer source counties.
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Table 10 Medi-Cal and HMO Tabulated Data Results
 
/o*J"Wvco /o«^ w-vsco /o\jr w«f=A3
 
#OFGASES #OFCASES #OFFEADIVIT REAOVITS READMHTED READMITTED READMITTBD
 
DESCRPnON MEDI-CAL HVD WED-GAL HMO IVBDI-CAL HMO
 DIFFERENCE
 
1131T 51^ 3,220 20.0% 19.7% 0.3/o
wraianrais
 
3gip "-^0^
 
-
¥6f^gcaI7^nriE~ TTTOT 1144 i35%r 21%
 
mr/iL
 37iO!T~ 6,741 4,564 182% 163^!^ 1T9% 
ISofA^/C^ "m:- ■ 17%^ 0'^-" ■ 0% 0.0% 0.0%" 110% 
20^

"77^ 33.6% 240%"' 9M)
 
Female 317111 """~2DTH1B 4.7^ 2,777 15.1% 13.5% " 18%
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i:ot— 18^7 504 471
 
27-^
 
39.1% 25.2% " 130r
 
. 4.7%
 
66-75 • "?er I2ir ^7" 347 327%
 
75^ OT 248 245" 348% 262% "80%
 
i\/isan%i 41 38 47 120^T"" f137% 6.6%
 
Race
 
—1^/fe "HTW 101?T 20.3%~ 172% '^Wo
 
"""Hac/c' 7.648 24.1%~ 171%" ^ 6.3%
 
in®~" "l.'W ii2r 462 13.6%
 
'
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A^A^— 2~~~in3% 4.1%" ""62%
 
32r/ 1.OT 4or 223 15.2^~ 12.17o ~31%
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TBpimSs — C^es—
 
#1-NLiTl3er 373 373 373 373
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 217
 
'^TT ^7f
 
»« 
"W 1.2%
 
iCTra^ 37cr
 
1,080 TT ^3r ^8%
 
~37r
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"1^
 
S24 73
 
H^SforT
 
IJec/ ^TlT "W TT 5:6%
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96^ niM" T3% —B7%
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Tiprf TTO/r
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To^ HTB" TT 77 "9T^
 
TO^ l!or TO^
 
MsaiLength ofStay 3.6 3.3 5.4 4.8
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Table 10 reveals preventable readmissions of all payers
 
and payers other than HMO and Medi-Cal. The purpose of these
 
groups was to measure the preventable readmission rates
 
among non-HMO/Medi-Gal payer beneficiaries, all payer
 
beneficiaries, HMO payer beheficiaries, and Medi-Cal payer
 
beneficiaries. There were no significant variations among
 
gender, age, race, dispositions, and type of admission when
 
all payers and non-HMO/Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries were
 
compared. When comparing the four payer groups (HMO, Medi-

Cal, All, and All Others), the HMO preventable readmissions
 
rates were lowest in nearly all categories (age, race,
 
gender, top DRGs, disposition, and type of admission). The
 
only negative difference is the 25.3% HMO mortality rate
 
compared to the 22.4% of All Other and the 23.3% rate of All
 
payer preventa.ble readmissions. Although it is impossible to
 
determine the exact severity of illness differences among
 
the payer groups, the top 5 DRGs, which comprise over 80% of
 
the episodes, are the sa.me for all of the payer groups.
 
The mean ages of the All and All Other payer categories
 
are 47.5 and 56.6 years, respectively. The mean ages of the
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All and All Other preventable readmission payer,categories
 
are 57.7 and 65.0 years, respectively.
 
:These mean ages are significantly higher than the HMO
 
and Medi-Cal mean ages.
 
It is expected that the mean ages for the All and All
 
Other payer categories would be higher because of the
 
Medicare payer populations.
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Table 11 Other Payers and All Payers Data Results
 
^ . l^Or %OFCASES /oOFCASES 
OTHER #OFCASES#OFREADMITS READMITS READMITTED %OFCASES READMITTED 
DESCRIPTION PAYERS ALLPAYERS OTHERS ALL OTHERS READMITTEDALL DIFFERENCE 
#df Medical Admits 61.697 104,833 17,458 26,046 283% 24.8% 3.5 
#ofSurgical Admits 40333 62,228 7,546 10,270 18.7% 16.5% 2.2 
TOTAL 102,030 167,061 25,004 36,316 24.5% 21.7% 2.8 
%ofAll Cases 61% 100% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 
SexMale 43,313 57,331 11,772 15,733 27.2% 274% -0.3 
Female 60,383 112,035 13,672 21,231 22.6% 19.0% 3.7 
Age 1-10 223 1i452 43 396 19.3% 27.3% -8.0 
11-20 2,317 11,716 270 1,532 117% 13.1% -1.4 
21-30 12,578 33,902 1,428 3,717 11.4% 11.0% 0.4 
31-40 12,709 26,577 1,745 3,765 13.7% 14.2% -0.4 
41-50 8,958 15,786 1,854 3,481 207% 22.1% -1.4 
51-60 8,898 15,089 2,435 4,332 27.4% 287% -1.3 
61-65 6,894 10,053 1,993 2,968 289% 29.5% -0.6 
66-75 24,273 26300 7,497 8,101 309% 30.8% 0.1 
7&r 26,846 28,492 8,179 8,672 30.5% 30.4% 0.0 
MeanAge 56.6 47.5 65.0 57.7 
Race 
Wrute 76,764 110,082 18,653 24,807 243% 22.5% 1.8 
Black 9,869 20,526 3,163 5,545 32.0% 27.0% 5.0 
Hispanic 12,426 27,784 2,699 4,788 21.7% 17.2% 4.5 
NativeAmer. 293 566 73 98 24.9% 17.3% 7.6 
Asian 3351 8,471 656 1,376 19.6% 16.2% 3.3 
Other 993 1,938 200 350 20.1% . 18.1% 2.1 
TopSDRGs —Ranked byPayerGases— 
#1-Number 373 373 373 373 
#1-Cases 7,304 26,451 196 908 27% 3.4% -0.7 
127 371 127 371 
if2-Cases 5,390 7,361 2,295 337 42.6% 4.6% 38.0 
#3-Nurrfoer 140 127 140 127 
ffS-Cases 2993 6,384 1,018 2,773 34.0% 43.4% -9.4 
#4-Nunr{ber 209 359 209 359 
iM-Cases : 2,554 3,944 497 160 19.5% 4.1% 15.4 
M-Hwfvber 371 140 371 140 
#5-Cases 2,444 3,889 102 1,309 4.2% 33.7% -29.5 
Disposition 
Oed 
HomeHealth 
3,523 
9,314,. 
4,190 
10,999 
789 
,3,334 
978 
3,955 
22.4% 
35.8% 
23.3% 
36.0% 
-0.9 
.0.2 :' 
AgainstAcMce 866 1,392 274 474 316% 34.1% -2.4 
Qherf^ility , 1,741 2,044 559 675 321% 33.0% -0.9 
SNF 8,252 9,206 2,750 3,104 33.3% 33.7% -0.4 
STAcute Care Facility 2,815 3,890 1,008 1,397 35.8% 35.9% -0.1 
Routine 77,185 137,646 16,730 26,381 21.7% 19.2% 2.5 
TypeofAdmission 
Emergency 16,400 22,444 . 4,451^ 6,235 27.1% 27.8% m 
Urgent 50,079 70,302 14,824 20,968 296% 29.8% -0.2 
Eective 25.938 36,751 5,756 8,082 22.2% 22.0% 0.2 
Delivery 11,399 39,961 396 1,653 3.5% 41% -0.7 
Unknown 60 89 17 26 28.3% 29.2% -0.9 
Mean#ofDiagnoses 3.3 3.1 4.0 3.7 
IVlean#C3fProc^ures 2.0 2.0 : 2.0 1.9 
Mean#ofAdmits 5.2 4.5 6.6 6.2 
Mean Length ofStay 1.0 1.0 2.6 2.7 
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Table 11 depicts the odds ratio calculations for payer
 
preventable readmissions. In addition, the r squared, odds
 
ratio, and relative risk. The Medi-Cal and All Payer table
 
depicts a weak negative correlation (r) of -0.03, a slight
 
negative relative risk of 0.843, and slight negative odds
 
ratio of 0.808.
 
The HMO and All Payer table depicts a weak negative
 
correlation of -0.054, a moderate negative relative risk of
 
0.711, and a moderate negative odds ratio of 0.658. The All
 
Others and All Payers table depicts the a weak correlation
 
of 0.031, a weak positive relative risk of 1.12, and a weak
 
positive odds ratio of 1.17. The Medi-Cal and HMO table
 
shows a very weak correlation of 0.026, a weak positive
 
relative risk of 1.12, and a weak positive odds ratio of
 
1.15. In other words, Medi-Cal cases are 1.12 times more
 
likely than HMO cases to be readmitted.
 
The Medi-Cal and All Others preventable readmissions
 
table shows a moderate negative correlation of -0.064, a
 
moderate negative relative risk of 0.75, and a moderate odds
 
ratio of 0.69.
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The HMO and All Others table show a moderate negative
 
correlation of -0.08, moderate to significant negative
 
relative risk of 0.66, and a moderate to significant
 
negative odds ratio of 0.60.
 
In other words. All Others cases are 1.40 times more
 
likely to experience preventable readmissions than HMO
 
cases.
 
The Medical and Surgical Admits table depicts a
 
significant correlation of 0.098, a strong relative risk
 
ratio of 1.51, and a strong odds ratio of 1.67. In other
 
words. Medical admissions are 1.5 times more likely to
 
experience preventable readmissions than surgical
 
admissions. The White and Non-white table statistics are
 
nearly similar. The Male and Female table depicts a
 
significant correlation of 0.097, a strong relative risk of
 
1.45, and a strong odds ratio of 1.62. In other words. Males
 
are more likely to experience preventable readmissions than
 
Females.
 
Table 12 depicts the two-by-two tables of various
 
payers, race, gender, and mortality.
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The Medi-Cal and All Payer table depicts a weak
 
negatrye correlation (r) of: -0.04, a strong negatlye ;
 
relative risk of 0.40, and strong negative odds ratio of
 
0.39. In words. All Other payer cases are 1.6 times more
 
likely to die than Medi-Cal cases; which, is expected due to
 
the inclusion of the Medicare elderly population in the All
 
Others category. V,
 
The HMO and All Payer table depicts a weak negative
 
correlation of -0.033, a strong negative relative risk of
 
0.424, and a strong negative odds ratio of 0.418.
 
In other words, HMO payer beneficiaries are 1.6 times
 
less likely to experience death when compared with All Payer
 
beneficiaries.
 
The Medi-Cal and All Payer mortality table shows a
 
moderate correlation of 0.069, a strong relative risk ratio
 
of 2.123, and a strong odds ratio of 2.186. This table
 
suggests that Medi-Cal patients are 2.12 times more likely
 
to die than the All Payer patients are. The most significant
 
results were revealed in the Medi-Cal and HMO mortality
 
table.
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There was a strong correlation of 0.10, a very strong
 
relative risk ratio of 5.01, and a very strong odd ratio of
 
5.23. This table indicates a chance five-fold of dying if a
 
Medi-Cal beneficiary than a HMO beneficiary.
 
The Medical and Surgical Admits mortality table depicts
 
a weak correlation of 0.027, a moderate relative risk ratio
 
of 1.45, and a moderate odds ratio of 1.47.
 
The White and Non-white table shows a weak correlation
 
of 0.028, a moderate to strong relative risk ratio of 1.457,
 
and a moderate to strong odds ratio of 1.507.
 
The Male and Female table depicts a moderate
 
correlation of 0.056, a strong relative risk of 1.99, and a
 
strong odds ratio of 2.04. In other words. Males are 1.99
 
times more likely to experience death than Females. Finally,
 
the Readmit and Non-readmit mortality table is similar.
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Table 12 Two by Two Tables of Readmitted Cases
 
2x2 Tables 
Rate Odds 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted r Ratio Ratio 
Medi-Cal 6,877 . 30,493 37,370 -0.032 , 0.843 0.808 
All Payers . 36,964 132,403 169,367 
43,841 162,896 206,737 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
HMO 4,346 23,658 28,004 -0.054 0.711 0.658 
All Payers 36,964 132,403 169,367 
41,310 156,061 197,371 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
A11 Others 25,444 : 78,252 103,696 0.031 - 1.124 , 1.165 
A11 Payers 36,964 . 132,403 169,367 
62,408 210,655 273,063 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
Medi-Cal ' 6,877 30,493 37,370 0.026 1.122 1.149 
HMO 4,643 23,658 28,301 
11,520 54,151 65,671 
Readmitted NonReadmitted 
Medi-Cal 6,877 30,493 .37,370 -0.064 0.750 0.694 
All Others 25,444 78,252 103,696 
32,321 108,745 141,066 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
HMO 4,643 23,658 28,301 -0.080 0.669 0.604 
All Others 25,444 78,252 103,696 
30,087 101,910 . 131,997 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
Medical Admits 26,046 78,787 104,833 0.098 1.505 1.673 
Surgical Admits 10,270 51,958 62,228 
36,316 130,745 167,061 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
White 24,807 85,275 110,082 0.023 1.099 1.128 
Non-White 12,157 47,128 59,285 
36,964' 132,403 169,367 
Readmitted Non-Readmitted 
Male 15,733 41,598 57,331 0.097 1.448 1.618 
Female 21,231 90,804 112,035 
36,964 132,402 169,366 
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Table 13 Two by Two Tables of Mortality Cases
 
2x2 Tables 
Relative Odds 
Death Non-Death r Risk Ratio 
Medi-Cal 370 37,000 37,370 -0.039 0.400 0.394 
All Payers 4,190 165,177 169,367 
4,560 202,177 206,737 
Death Non-Death 
HMO 297 28,004 28>301 -0.033 0.424 0.418 
All Payers 4,190 165,177 169,367 
4,487 193,181 197,668 
Death Non-Death 
Medi-Cal 3,087 55,678 58,765 0.069 2.123 2.186 
All Payers 4,190 165,177 169,367 
7,277 220,855 228,132 
Death Non-Death 
Medi-Cal 3,087 55,678 58,765 0.102 5.006 5.228 
HMO 297 28,004 28,301 
3,384 83,682 87,066 
Death Non-Death 
Medical Admits 2,876 101,957 104,833 0.027 1.457 1.470 
Surgical Admits 1,172 61,056 62,228 
4,048 163,013 167,061 
Death Non-Death 
White 3,079 107,003 110,082 0.028 1.493 1.507 
Non-White 1,111 58,174 59,285 
4,190 165,177 169,367 
Death Non-Death 
Male 2,119 55,212 57,331 0.056 1.999 2.038 
Female 2,071 109,964 112,035 
4,190 165,176 
Death Non-Death 
Readmit 978 35,986 36,964 0.006 1.091 1.093 
Non-Readmit 3,212 129,191 , 132,403 
4,190 165,177 
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Summary
 
The data show that HMOs have better mortality and
 
preventable readmission rates than all of the other payer
 
types. The Medi-Cal populations are younger, yet have
 
greater preventable readmission and mortality rates than the
 
HMO populations. The top five diagnoses for Medi-Cal and HMO
 
populations are nearly the same.
 
Hypothesis Testing
 
HMO and Medi-Cal Payer beneficiaries
 
The preventable readmission and mortality variables
 
have been dichotomized to zero and one values to provide
 
percentage results. The zero value represents non-

preventable readmission and non-mortality. The value of one
 
represents positive preventable readmission and positive
 
mortality.
 
Readmissions
 
The results depicted in table 11 reveal an odds ratio
 
of 1.149 for readmitted Medi-Cal versus HMO readmitted
 
hospital discharge cases. The Medi-Cal readmitted versus All
 
Payers readmissions reveals an odds ratio of 0.808.
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Also, the HMO readmitted versus All Payers readraissions
 
reveals an odds ratio of 0.658. These data show that Medi
 
cal payer plan readmissions are more likely to occur than
 
HMO payer plan heneficiaryreadmissions.
 
The conclusion of these results is therefore to accept
 
the null hypothesis that Medi-Cal payer plan beneficiaries
 
would not experience higher risks of readmissions if
 
enrolled in HMO payer plans.
 
Mortality
 
The results depicted in table 12 reveal a strong odds
 
ratio of 5.228 for Medi-Cal deaths versus HMO deaths. The
 
Medi-Cal deaths versus All Payer deaths reveals an odds
 
ratio of 0.394.
 
Also, the HMO deaths versus All Payer deaths reveals an
 
odds ratio of 0.418. These data show that Medi-Cal payer
 
plan deaths are far more likely to occur than HMO payer plan
 
beneficiary readmissions.
 
The conclusion of these results is therefore to accept
 
the null hypothesis that Medi-Cal payer plan beneficiaries
 
would not experience higher risks of deaths if enrolled in
 
HMO payer plans.
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Summary
 
The result of the Odds Ratio statistical test is to
 
accept the null hypothesis that no statistical difference
 
exists between Medi-Cal and HMO discharges.
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Discussion
 
In an effort to control health care costs and provide
 
quality health care, many states are enrolling public aid
 
populations in HMOs and other forms of managed care pilans.
 
In 1981 there were 280,000 Medicaid payer beneficiaries
 
enrolled in HMOs compared with 2.7 million in 1987.
 
Government agencies expect managed care plans to yield cost
 
savings, or at least slow the rate at which health care
 
costs are increasing, by greater preventive care and
 
controlled utilization.
 
During the late 1980s, the expanded pursuit of Medicaid
 
managed cafe contracting has led states to seek federal HCFA
 
waivers from the freedom-of-choice clause.
 
In some states, enrollment in HMOs or some capitated
 
organizational form is mandatory. However, the health care
 
organizations have not always been eager to provide coverage
 
to the Medicaid population. The frequency of eligibility,
 
high utilization rates, and chronic conditions associated
 
with the Medicaid populations coupled with the reimbursement
 
rates below traditional fee-for-service rates have made the
 
Medicaid population less financially desirable.
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Moreover, the managed care organizations have been
 
scrutinized and criticized by health care advocates for
 
discouraging utilization.
 
The Cehter for Public Rep of Milwaukee
 
reported many examples of discouraged utilization among
 
mandatory Medicaid HMO plans. The study cites examples of
 
avoidance of specialist referrals and a lack of prenatal and
 
family planning services. The study also depicts a lack of
 
beneficiary knowledge about the system and services
 
available to members and discontinuities in prenatal carei
 
California has been very successful with managed care.
 
Although there have been limited resources per beneficiary,
 
higher than average unemployment and underemployment, high
 
immigration, lower tax revenues, diminishing federal funds, :
 
higher tax burdens, and environmental impairments, the
 
health status indicators and outcomes appear to be favorable
 
when compared with the national data. Overall, the Medi-Cal
 
fee-for-service data show no statistically significant
 
differences when compared with the HMO data. In some cases,
 
the HMOs have more favorable outcomes.
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The HMOs in California have been eyolving and maturing
 
for decades and have led the nation in refining and
 
exploring more efficient and effective care. Clearly, the
 
outcomes satisfy Donabedian's definition of guality care,
 
that which does more good than harm, and which is efficient
 
and effective. California HMOs seem to be max;imizing the
 
utility of scarce and diminishing resdurces..
 
The type of health insurance plan one belongs to will
 
determine the use of health cafe services according to the
 
Andersen behavioral model. Health plans fit into the
 
enabling segment of the model and their influences span
 
across system differences, financial barriers, access,
 
community resources, and social support, in the Donabedian
 
model, health insurance plans span across structure and
 
process of the three-segment model. Both models lend
 
validity to health care assessment.
 
The selection of preventable readmissibns and mortality
 
as indicators of the quality of care were selected because
 
they are clear events that can be measured, increase the
 
costs to patients or providers, and result in undesirable
 
consequences.
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The: choice of outcome measures from among the range of
 
possibiiities present a challenge.to researchers and health
 
care professionaTs. It was my choice to select mortality
 
because death is certainly an unwanted, and in most cases
 
costly, outcome. Preventable readmissions are unwanted by
 
the health care professionals, patients, payers, and society
 
because they are costly in real and indirect terms. Although
 
preventable readmission and mortality rates in this research
 
fail to identify the discrete causes of their outcome, they
 
edify changes or differences from some baseline of
 
acceptable limits. If the diagnoses, severity of illness,
 
and demographic characteristics of populations are the same,
 
real difference in the quality of care should not exist.
 
In terms of policy development, a greater impact
 
assessment must be compiled to determine the baseline of
 
care, the demographic needs of the various communities, and
 
audit guidelines. The increased enrollment of Medi-Cal payer
 
beneficiaries in HMOs will yield improvements in care and
 
costs if outcome measurements and verification audit
 
mechanisms correspond.
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Alternatively, the continued lack of policies,
 
verification mechanisms, and regulations may yield adverse
 
outcomes for Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries and more costs to
 
society, health care providers/ and payers. Moreover, The
 
DHS should develop Medi-Cal reimbursement policies directly ;
 
linked to the various dimensions of quality pf care^^^
 
The enrollment of Medicaid and Medicare payer
 
beneficiaries in HMOs theoretically provides incentives for
 
the early hospital discharge. However, the analysis of the
 
1991 California data does not support this premise.
 
Literature related to this subject, in general, suggest
 
that early discharges may increase the risk of.subseguent
 
preventable readmission if all necessary medical care is not
 
completed during a patient's first hospital stay. Therefore,
 
further research and close monitoring should continue to
 
create more explicit causal linkages.
 
The Health Care Financing Administration (1988)
 
requires that preventable readmissions within 31 days of
 
discharge be reviewed by peer review organizations to
 
determine if the preceding discharge was premature or if
 
other quality problems existed and should entice providers
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to maintain quality. However, coding bias may cause some
 
cases to avoid review.
 
In 1993, the department released a "strategic plan"
 
intended to rapidly move the Medi-Cal Program toward a
 
"managed care" approach for providing services to Medi-Cal
 
payer beneficiaries. In this section, I make several
 
recommendations regarding the department's proposed
 
expansion.
 
The Legislature and the department have, for several
 
years, attempted to increase the number of Medi-Cal payer
 
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care arrangements. In
 
particular, legislation accompanying the 1992 Budget Act
 
gave the department broad authority to expand managed care
 
in California, with the goals of improving benefiGiary
 
access to care and making tha Medi-Cal Program more cost-

effective.
 
Approximately 1 million out of 5.5 million Medi-Cal
 
payer beneficiaries were enrblled in a managed care
 
arrangement by the end of 1994-95. The department
 
anticipates this number will increase to a total of 2.5
 
million by the end of 1995-96.
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Under managed care arrangements, the Medi-Cal Program
 
attempts to control costs by generally reimbursing providers
 
on a "capitated," or per-person basis regardless of the
 
number of services any given individual uses. In addition,
 
the use of specialists and high-cost services require a
 
physician referral. This approach contrasts with the fee-

for-service system, where Medi-Cal pays providers for each
 
service they provide, and the beneficiary has his or her
 
choice in selecting providers. In fee-for-service,
 
utilization is controlled by requiring prior authorization
 
from the Medi-Cal field offices for the more expensive
 
medical services.
 
The principal managed care arrangements are:
 
Medi-Cal contracts with private Prepaid Health Plans
 
(PHPs) to provide care to AFDC-linked payer beneficiaries.
 
The PHPs are paid a monthly capitation payment, based
 
on an estimate of the costs of serving payer beneficiaries
 
in the fee-for-service system. The department generally has
 
not entered into contracts to enroll SSl/SSP-linked payer
 
beneficiaries in PHPs. Under the approach of County-

Organized Health Systems (COHS), the county acts as a
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prepaid plan, serving all Medi-Cal payer bendficiaries in
 
the county. The COHS receive a capitated rate for each
 
beneficiary in the cpunty, and assume fijll finahGial risk.
 
Currently, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, and Solano Counties
 
have fully ittiplemehted this approach, and. two additiohal
 
counties--Orange and Santa Cruz--wil1 begin very soon.
 
Federal law prohibits additional county-organized systems in
 
California beyond these five.
 
Under the approach of Geographic Managed Care (GMC),
 
the Medi-Cal Program negotiates contracts directly with
 
providers to accept payer beneficiaries within a specified
 
area, paying a monthly rate based on the estimated cost of
 
providing services to similar payer beneficiaries under the
 
fee-for-service system.
 
The department implemented this approach in Sacramento
 
County April of 1994, and intends to implement a second
 
project in San Diego County.
 
Primary Care Case Management (PCCM) plans are paid a
 
fixed monthly fee (per capita) to manage the care of the
 
Medi-Cal payer beneficiaries enrolled in the plan. They
 
approve referrals to specialists, non-emergency
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hospitallzations, and other higli-cost procedures. If the
 
costs of care for enrollees in a PCCM plan are less than the
 
estimated fee-for-s0rvice cost would have been for similar
 
payer beneficiaries, the PCCM plan receives a payment equal
 
to half the estimated savings.
 
The department's strategic plan and the budget propose
 
to enroll nearly half of all beneficiaries (2.5 million out
 
of an estimated 5.5 million) in a managed care arrangement
 
by late 1995-96. The plan proposes to expand the number of
 
beneficiaries served under managed care arrangements
 
primarily by implementing the aforementioned managed care
 
strategies and expanding managed care models to additional
 
counties.
 
I suggest that the department enact legislation which
 
would require the inclusion of newly enrolled SSl/SSP-linked
 
beneficiaries in the counties targeted for managed care
 
changes to enroll in managed care plans while allowing
 
existing beneficiaries to rema.in under FFFS arrangements for
 
the next two years. This would allow the current continuum
 
of care to remain stable for providers and beneficiaries for
 
a transitional period of time.
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In addition, I recommend greater research, planning,
 
and implementation of clinical guidelines for the top 80%
 
most costly procedures. The literature strongly suggests
 
that significaht savings ca.n be reali^ed:^ the;
 
wide variatidns of inappropriate care.
 
Also, the development and fostering of strategic
 
partnerships among the government agencies, pharmaceutical
 
industry, hospitals, practitioners, business, and academic
 
organizations may yield efficient solutions to serious
 
health care issues.
 
I believe that the Medi-Cal populations will benefit 
from the HMO continuum of care that is incented to promote 
better health and which is structurally more consistent than 
the fragmented fee-for-service structure. The HMO; 
preventable readmission and mortality rates depict better 
outcomes, include a more mainstream population, and would 
better control the continuum of care for Medi-Cal payer 
beneficiaries. In addition, greater regulation of HMOs is ■ 
becoming more prevalent; which, safeguard the patient's 
rights. 
Finally, the ultimate problem facing all Americans is
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how to allocate scarce resources to all that is fair,
 
efficierit, and politically acceptable. The: goal of health
 
care leaders is to develop methods which ensure that the
 
decisions are not random. The use of outcomes analysis is a
 
good tool for organizing, delivering, and monitoring
 
efficient and equitable care. The Medicaid population is
 
comprised of a population, which is markedly different from
 
those historically, enrolled in HMOs.
 
The needs of these low-income women and children,
 
disabled, elderly, and ethnically diverse populations
 
include greater understanding of their specific needs,
 
timely-assessments and response, simplified geographic
 
access, greater education to empower the beneficiary, and
 
greater understanding about the environment within which
 
they 1ive.
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APPENDIX--TABLE FIELD DEFINITIONS^
 
Variable Description
 
■'age' ' ' 
PAYMENT SOURCE 
■l=Medicare ■ .■ : 
:.''v AG==Me
 
3=Worker's Compensation
 
4=Title V
 
5=0ther Government
 
6=Blue Cross/Blue Shield
 
7=Insurance Company
 
8=HM0/PHP
 
"	 .■?'=Self-Pay" 
10=No Charge 
ll=Other Non-Government" 
12=Medically Indigent (Sec. 1700) 
PRINCIPAL 	DIAGNOSIS 
OTHER DX 1 
OTHER DX 2 
OTHER DX 3 
OTHER DX A'-^i 
RACE 
; i=white 'v/.: . 	 ^ 
2=Black 
3=Hispanic 
4=Native Am./Eskimo 
5=Asian ■ ■ •■ ' 
P--' y:;\6=0theD 
7=Unknown 
SEX 
l=Male
 
2=Female
 
3=Other
 
4=Unknown
 
ZIP CODE 
COUNTY OF 	RESIDENCE
 
l=Alameda
 
2=Alpine
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3=Amador
 
4=Butte
 
5=Calaveras
 
6=Colusa
 
7=Contra Costa
 
8=E1 Norte
 
9=E1 Dorado
 
10=Fresno
 
ll=Glenn
 
12=Hutnboldt
 
13=Imperial
 
14=Inyo
 
15=Kern
 
16=Kings
 
17=Lake
 
18=Lassen
 
19=Los Angeles
 
20=Madera
 
21=iyiarin
 
22=Mariposa
 
23=Mendocino
 
24=Merced
 
25=Modoc
 
26=Mono
 
27=Monterey
 
28=Napa
 
29=Nevada
 
30=Orange
 
31=Placer
 
32=Plumas
 
33=Riverside
 
34=Sacratnento
 
35=San Benito
 
36=San Bernardino
 
37=San Diego
 
38=San Francisco
 
39=San Joaquin
 
40=San Luis Obispo
 
41=San Mateo
 
42=Santa Barbara
 
43=Santa Clara
 
44=Santa Cruz
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45=:Shasta
 
46=Sierra
 
47=Siskiyou
 
48=Solano
 
49=Sonoma
 
50=Stanislaus
 
51=Sutter
 
52=Tehama
 
53=Trinity
 
54=Tulare
 
55=Tuolumne
 
56=Ventura
 
57=Yolo
 
58=Yuba
 
RECORD NUMBER
 
HOSPITAL
 
ADMISSION SOURCE
 
ll=Routine
 
12=Emergency Room
 
13=Short-Term Acute Care Hospital
 
14=InterTnediate Care Facility
 
15=Skilled Nursing Facility
 
16=0ther Facility
 
17=Home Health Service
 
18=Newborn
 
19=0ther
 
ADMISSION TYPE
 
l=Emergency
 
2=Urgent
 
3=Elective
 
4=Newborn
 
5=Delivery
 
6=Unknown/0ther
 
DRG
 
PRINCIPAL PROCEDURE
 
OTHER PROC. 1
 
OTHER PROC. 2
 
OTHER PROC. 3
 
OTHER PROC. 4
 
LENGTH OF STAY
 
ADMIT DATE CODE
 
DISPOSITION
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l=Routine Discharge
 
2=Short-Term Acute Care Hospital
 
3=Intermediate Care Facility
 
4=Skilled Nursing Facility
 
5=0ther Healthcare Facility
 
6=Against Medical Advice
 
7=Home Health Service
 
8=Died
 
ADMISSION DAY
 
l=Sunday
 
2=Monday
 
3=Tuesday
 
4=Wednesday
 
5=Thursday
 
6-Friday
 
7=Saturday
 
ADMISSION MONTH/YEAR
 
REPORT SOURCE
 
l^General Acute Care Report
 
2=Skilled Nursing/Intermediate Care Report
 
4=Psychiatric Care Report
 
5=Alcohol/Drug Rehabilitation Report
 
6=Rehabilitation Report
 
HOSPITAL COUNTY
 
l=Alameda
 
2=Alpine
 
3=Amador
 
4=Butte
 
5-Calaveras
 
6=Colusa
 
7=Contra Costa
 
8=Del Norte
 
9=E1 Dorado
 
10=Fresno
 
ll=Glenn
 
12=Humboldt
 
13=Imperial
 
14=Inyo
 
15=Kern
 
16=Kings
 
17=Lake
 
18=Lassen
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 19-Los Ange1es
 
20=Madera
 
2l-Marin
 
22=]yiariposa
 
23=Mendocino
 
24=Merced
 
25-Modoc
 
26=Mono
 
27=Monterey
 
28=Napa
 
■ ■ 2-9-Nevada: 
0=Orange 
3l=Placer 
32=Plumas 
33=Riverside 
34=Sacramento 
35=San Benito 
36=San Bernardino 
37=San Diego/. 
38=San Francisco 
39=San Joaquin 
40=San Luis Obispo 
41=San Mateo 
42=Santa Barbara 
43=Santa Clara 
44=Santa Cruz 
45=Shasta 
46=Sierra 
47=Siskiyou 
48=Solano 
49=Sonoma 
50=Stanislaus 
51=Sutter 
52=Tehama 
53=Trinity 
54=Tulare 
55=Tuolutnne 
56=Ventura 
57=Yolo 
58=Yuba 
# OF DIAGNOSES 
# OF PROCEDURES 
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# ADMISSIONS /
 
MDC-MAJOR DIAGN, CAT.
 
MEDICAL/StJRGICAL
 
l=Surgical DRG
 
2-Medical DRG
 
MULTIPLE ADMISSIONS
 
■o=No' ' . 
.1=;Y€S
 
ADMIT DATE
 
ADMITS IN MONTH
 
AGE CATEGORIES
 
A O=0utlier 
• 1=1-10' '^ 
A:';;" 2=11-20 •
 
\ ■ :3=21-30'. ■
 
4=31-40
 
■■5=4i-50'' ' ■ ■ ■ 
/ . 	 6=51-60 
n=si-s5: 
8=65--75. 
' A-V9=76+' ■. . a ' 
OTHERPAY 
/: 1. 00=ALL OTHERS 
2. oo=medi-cal; ; 
S.pO=HMO 
MORTALITY
 
: O=non-death
 
, /',l=death­
: , PAYER ■; ; 
Q=Medi-Cai: 
1=HM0 : 
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